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The Laconomics of Apples and Oranges:
A Speculative Analysis
of the Economic Concept of
Commensurability
Jeanne L. Schroeder*
I. INTRODUCTION: As COMPARED TO WHAT?
Much recent debate on the economic analysis of law has focused on
"commensurability"--the proposition that all options can be compared by
reference to a single metric-such as utility or money.' Legal economists 2
argue not only that we can, but that we should, compare alternatives and
make choices based on commensuration. Indeed, neo-classical price
theory holds that only choices made on the basis of commensurability are
economically rational.3  Critics of this position argue that certain
* Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York
City.
I. See generally Symposium: Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1998).
Matthew Adler suggests:
Roughly speaking, "incommensurability" means the absence of a scale or metric. But what,
more precisely, nonmetricity involves can be fleshed out in a large number of different ways,
as the existing philosophical and legal literature on incommensurability shows .... The
incommensurability of options or choices might mean: (1) the incomparability of options or
choices, such that no numerical ranking of the options in the order of their comparative worth
is possible; (2) the failure of a particular kind of scale, such as a monetary scale or a
consequentialist scale, to track the comparative worth of options; and (3) the fact that a
scaling procedure (either a particular scaling procedure or any scaling procedure at all) is not
the best procedure by which to choose among options.
The incommensurability of options or choices, in one sense, means their incomparability.
Two options are incomparable if it is false that one option is better than the other ... false
that one is worse than the other, but also false that the two are equally good.
Matthew Adler, Symposium: Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169,
1170 (1998).
Different participants in this debate differ somewhat on their definitions of commensurability.
Because I critique the basic philosophical assumptions underlying the commensurability-
incommensurability antinomy, this Article will not offer a comprehensive account of the literature.
2. For simplicity, in this Article when I refer to law-and-economics and legal economists I am
referring primarily to the strain that is based on neo-classical price theory most closely associated with
Judge Richard Posner.
3. According to Ruth Chang, "Conventional wisdom has it that the comparability of alternatives
is necessary for the possibility of justified choice. After all, if two items cannot be compared, what
ground could there be for choosing one rather than the other." Ruth Chang, Comparison and the
1
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alternatives cannot or perhaps should not be ranked according to some
single metric or lowest common denominator because no single metric can
capture the rich diversity of values. Indeed, to even attempt such a
utilitarian calculus is to diminish our humanity.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the symposium on Law and
Incommensurability held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
1998, this has largely been a debate without dialogue. Both proponents
and opponents of commensurability tend to assert that their position must
be true because the presuppositions on which their opposition's position is
based are self-evidently false. Consequently, the debate resembles an "is
not," "is too" playground argument. Rather than making logical arguments
derived from a set of first principles, both sides of the arguments rely
primarily on empirical examples that supposedly disprove the tenets of
their opponent.4
The proponents of both sides of the argument do agree, however, that
commensurability and incommensurability form an either-or choice.
Accordingly, they presume that the truth of their own side can be
established by pointing out the flaws of the other side. The debate is
owned, but only temporarily, by whoever makes the last argument. Both
sides are, therefore, ultimately equally unconvincing. We have before us a
classic Kantian antinomy based on apagogic reasoning.
The legal economist temporarily persuades by asserting that, despite the
denials of incommensurabilists, they in fact commensurate alternatives
every time they make a choice. The clich& "you can't compare apples and
oranges" may be popular, but it is disproved every time one goes to the
grocery store and chooses to buy-and pay for-an orange rather than an
apple. The economist's romantic opponent temporarily regains the field by
arguing that the mere fact that we can and do make choices does not mean
that we equate alternatives for all, or even most, purposes. It would be a
culinary disaster if "Mom" tried to substitute oranges for apples in her
traditional pie. The economist might counter that the fact that one can
determine that the "apple" pie recipe made with oranges is inferior to that
made with apple shows, once again, that one is commensurating the
alternatives (i.e. comparing the two via some specific metric like tastiness,
Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1569 (1998). In Matthew Adler's words,
"comparability is a necessary condition for justified choice. On this view, justified choice between
incomparables is impossible..." Adler, supra note 1, at 1172. Adler considers comparability to be one
of the possible definitions of commensurability found in the literature. Id. at 1170.
4. A similar point has been made by Donald Regan even though he takes a strong
commensurabilist position ("the incomparabilist's strongest argument is still the exhibition of
examples where making a comparison seems virtually impossible"). Donald Regan, Value
Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
REASONING 129, 137 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) [hereinafter INCOMMENSURABILITY]. Consequently, he
despairs that "nothing I have said will change the mind of someone who just finds it obvious that
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or a general one like utility). An on and on and on. Both sides assume that
something crucial hangs on the question of
commensurability---specifically that one's position on commensurability
has a necessary relationship to one's position on the economic analysis of
law. That is, if one agrees that commensuration is possible or appropriate,
then one should-or must--also accept a utilitarian, cost-benefit analysis
of legal regimes. A rejection of utilitarianism, therefore, seems to require a
rejection of commensuration. Consequently, both sides assume that if they
lose the debate on commensurability then they must also give up their
most cherished legal and political ideals.
It is the thesis of this Article that absolutely nothing depends on this
debate precisely because the debate itself is inept. Indeed, Immanuel Kant
predicted that arguments based on such "antinomies" must inevitably
devolve into an intellectual ping-pong game of alternating assertions.
The commensurability debate is firmly located within the classical,
liberal philosophical tradition that includes utilitarianism, libertarianism,
egalitarianism, contractarianism, 5 and some forms of neo-Kantian moral
theory. 6 There is an alternative super- or post-liberal tradition--the
speculative tradition--that begins with Immanuel Kant, continues through
G.W.F. Hegel and is developed in the later twentieth-century in
Continental critical thought, generally, and the psychoanalytic theory of
Jacques Lacan, specifically.
In contrast to classical liberalism, speculative theory does not assume
that one side of the commensurability debate is the opposite or simple
negative of the other. Rather, the speculative tradition has its origin in
Kant's insight that certain propositions that seem to be logically
inconsistent with each other may necessarily require each other in the
sense that each is a true but incomplete and inadequate description of the
world. Hegel famously expressed Kant's paradox as the doctrine of the
identity of identity and difference.7 Interestingly for the purposes of this
Article, Hegel developed this through the specific example of the
dialectical relationship between quantity (commensurability) and quality
(incommensurability). In the twentieth century, psychoanalyst Lacan goes
further and interprets this paradox as the very heart of human
subjectivity-a subjectivity formed by an essential non-relationship
between the masculine (commensurability) and the feminine
(incommensurability). However, in a few evocative paragraphs in his
5. These are the four categories of classical liberalism identified by Michel Rosenfeld. MICHEL
ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY
52-53, 65-66, 94-95, 116-18 (1991).
6. The neo-Kantian work that probably has had the most influence on American jurisprudence is
JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
7. JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 109-10
(Samuel Cherniak & John Heckman trans., 1974).
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Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,8 Kant anticipated how the
commensurability debate might reply to the relationship of the market to
personality.
It is the radical proposition of speculative theory that the paradox that
lies at the heart of the commensurability debate is a logically necessary
aspect of all symbolic orders-a category that includes not only social
systems and language, but also sexuality, law, and markets. That is, from a
speculative position, the examples I will discuss in this article are not
relevant to law by mere analogy. Legal and sexual categories are not
similar as an empirical matter; rather they are equivalent from a logical
one in that they are sub-categories of the symbolic.
In this Article, I do not pretend to offer a complete or comprehensive
survey of the literature in the commensurability/incommensurability
debate. Nor shall I discuss the slightly differing definitions of
commensurability, incommensurability, and comparability offered by the
participants. Nor, finally, do I investigate the nature of economic choice
and the ethics of "selling out."
What I shall do is first introduce the commensuration debate in legal
scholarship. I then trace the speculative relationship between
commensuration and incommensuration from its initial formulation by
Kant, through its universalization by Hegel, and to its radical extreme as
proposed by Lacan. I argue that, even though the two concepts or
commensurability and incommensurability are logically incompatible,
every choice-legal or otherwise--necessarily reflects a moment of both
commensuration (the recognition of quantitative difference) and
incommensuration (the recognition of qualitative difference).
That is, from the speculative perspective, there is no way to resolve the
commensurablility debate because it reflects a logically necessary paradox
that constitutes all symbolic thought, and perhaps the entire universe as it
can be understood by human reason. Consequently, this paradox is
something we can only learn to "deal with." Moreover, freedom and
morality consist precisely of the problem of what it means to make choices
given the irresolvability of this paradox.
Proponents of both sides of the commensurability debate in law assume
that their position have necessary policy implications. In contrast, the
speculative thinker believes that philosophy can never dictate specific
policy advice. Policy is a moral decision that necessarily requires the free
and subjective act of decision. We cannot escape our moral responsibility
by invoking necessity. We are responsible for our decisions precisely
because they are our decisions. Consequently, although the participants in
the commensurability debate assume it has policy implications, the
8. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785).
[Vol. 15:347
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speculative position rejects this conclusion. The debate is merely a way of
obfuscating the real issues involved and avoiding responsibility.
The question of what it means to come to a judgment is one of the
central concerns of speculative theory. A speculative analysis shows that,
on the one hand, insofar as we can identify alternatives, we recognize that
each alternative has a unique "quality" that distinguishes and differentiates
it from others. This means that, at some level, the very recognition of two
alternatives as distinct is itself an example of incommensurability. On the
other hand, all alternatives are also quantitatively related and, therefore,
can be commensurated. When one chooses one alternative over another,
one is, at that moment, comparing them based on some criterion and,
therefore, commensurating. Paradoxically, to choose is, once again, to
recognize the qualitative difference or incommensurability. But to
exchange one alternative for another is simultaneously the recognition of
equivalence or commensuration. In other words, choice and exchange
form the place at which commensuration and incommensuration meet.
A speculative theorist, therefore, agrees with the utilitarian that
commensuration is both possible and a necessary aspect of choice.
Nevertheless, she disagrees with the utilitarian's assertion that rational
choice is determined by commensuration. Commensurability along a
single metric is never a reason to make a choice or engage in an exchange
because rationality is defined as the very capacity for spontaneous,
free-and therefore incommensurate-action. Commensurable values
merely represent a limitation on the choices one can make in the sense that
one is limited to choosing what one can afford. Incommensurable or
qualitative values always drive choice. Consequently, the speculative
theorist agrees with the romantic that human dignity and freedom require
the recognition of one, irreducible moment of incommensurability in
human personality.
II. COMMENSURABILITY IN THE LAW REVIEWS
Legal academic interest in commensuration 9 was sparked in 1994 when
Mary Chang organized a symposium that eventually produced a volume of
essays published under the name Incommensurability, Incomparability,
9. This is not to say that other legal theorists have not anticipated this debate before. As I discuss
infra text accompanying notes 15-16), much of Posner's legal economics depends on an acceptance of
some form of the commensuration proposition, although he does not regularly use this term. On the
other side, since the 1980s Margaret Jane Radin has based her vigorous romantic critique of legal
economics largely in terms of a denial of commensuration, although she more frequently uses the
terminology of "market-alienation" and "commodification." See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADiN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993)
[hereinafter RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY]; Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 1993 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability].
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and Practical Reason,' ° and Cass Sunstein published an article entitled
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law."' This is turn led to the major
symposium on commensuration at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School to which I have already referred.
Although the essays differ in many ways, they tend to share a similar
structure. First, the vast majority12 of both the supporters and opponents of
commensurability assume that they are discussing a strict, either-or
choice: rational decision makers either do, or should, make decisions
through commensuration. This, in turn, leads to a second assumption that
one can prove one's side of the argument by disproving the other side.
These proofs and disproofs typically consist not of reasoned arguments
from first principles, but of examples and counter-examples designed to
appeal to our intuitions.
Commensuration is closely related to the variant of "economic
rationality" adopted by that strain of neo-classical economics that
dominates American "law-and-economics" literature.' 3 According to this
theory, economically rational actors seek to maximize some
desideratum--usually utility or wealth. In order to do so they must
compare different alternatives with respect to this desideratum. Some form
of commensurability is also a necessary component of "cost benefit
analysis" advocated by many legal economists. Consequently, the
arguments for or against commensurability have been presented largely as
arguments about the validity or appropriateness of the economic analysis
of law. For simplicity, I will refer to the proponents of commensuration as
"utilitarians" regardless of what desideratum of commensuration they
adopt. For lack of a better term, based on an analysis I have developed
elsewhere, I will refer to their opponents as "romantics. 14
The problem with the duel by example is precisely that predicted by
Kant: He who speaks last wins-but only temporarily. When the romantic
gives his examples, one is initially drawn to agree that there is something
unique about the alternatives that cannot be reduced to such prosaic
metrics as utility or money. The romantic examples appeal to our intuition
that the utilitarian account of how we choose does not match our
individual subjective experience.
10. Supra note 4.
11. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1994).
12. One refreshing exception that proves this general rule is Frederick Schauer. He states that
commensurability and incommensurability have "the character or attitudes, dispositions,
presumptions, or conceptual frameworks, and, as such, they are best thought of as being chosen rather
than as simply existing and, furthermore, as being chosen for instrumental and not intrinsic reasons."
Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1998).
13. As I discuss elsewhere, this definition of rationality is far from being universally accepted
among economists. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics
Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147 (2000).
14. I explain my choice of terminology in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The
Ambiguity of Gift, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815, 824-26 (1999)
[Vol. 15:347
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And yet, when one reads the utilitarian riposte it is hard to deny that the
romantic's claims are to some extent disingenuous: in fact, we
commensurate when we make choices all the time, we just do not like to
face this fact. Indeed, we have no choice but to commensurate when we
choose. To choose is to commensurate. But, when the romantic replies,
once again one feels that one has to admit that commensuration misses
something about both our valuation of alternatives and the actuality of
choosing.
For example, let us turn to the debate about whether such intimate
interpersonal relationships as love and friendship can be accurately
analyzed in terms of commensuration. Richard Posner tries to analyze all
human relations in economic terms. In his notorious book, Sex and
Reason,' 5 he argues that even with respect to sexuality--the aspect of
personality often assumed to be irrational-most persons act, on the
average, as though they were economically rational actors. Writing in the
early 1990s, Posner does not speak expressly in terms of commensuration
but, as I have just suggested, the type of comparisons necessary to engage
in the maximization behavior described by Posner assumes that decision
makers are able to rank alternatives according to a single metric. Although
I find many of Posner's specific arguments to be fanciful "just-so stories"
without any empirical support,16 my own empirical observation of
competition in the "marriage" market makes certain broad contours of his
approach initially convincing.
In response, Cass Sunstein maintains that attempts to explain certain
choices in terms of commensurability do not capture our subjective
experience. The commensuration of interpersonal relationships described
by Posner and his followers is either impossible, or, perhaps more
accurately, constitutes an inadequate account of empirical human
behavior. We should not, therefore, adopt legal rules that assume that
people commensurate such things, or that incentivizes them to do so.
Sunstein asserts that "[i]f someone really thought about dating and
romance as participation in a 'marriage market,' he would be a strange
creature indeed (and unlikely, perhaps, to fare especially well in the
relevant practices)."' 17 Three of his examples of incommensurable
15. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
16. 1 set forth my criticism of Posner at length in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just-So Stories: Posnerian
Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001)
17. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 816. To state the obvious, although such expressly mercenary
motives may be frowned upon in modem American society that places a premium on romance,
Sunstein is declaring "strange" the majority of people in many modem, and probably the majority of
historical, societies in which arranged marriages are the norm. His other examples in this paragraph
also reveal that Sunstein is viewing life from the extremely narrow perspective of a privileged, upper
middle-class American academic. For example, he also thinks that it is "odd," "barely recognizable,"
and even "debased" to think of publishing as "selling an idea" of education in oneself or one's children
as "investing in human capital." Id. at 816. Once again, I suspect that he is dismissing a large
2003]
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alternatives involve interpersonal relationships. If one were to cancel a
social engagement with a friend, offering a "cash payment would be
inconsistent with the way that someone values a friend."' 8 If someone
offered to pay a person a salary "to spend a month away from home and
family, [she] will probably feel insulted and degraded and [she] may well
turn him down."' 19 "If someone offers to pay an adult neighbor to mow his
lawn, the neighbor will often regard the request as an insult, because it
reflects an inappropriate valuation of the neighbor., 20 Such monetization
of relationships is inconsistent with affection. In Joseph Raz's words,
"[o]nly those who hold the view that friendship is neither better nor worse
than money, but is simply not comparable to money or other commodities
are capable of having friends."'', These statements have great intuitive
appeal. Who can think of trading one's love for money?
However, as Jason Scott Johnston points out, if one looks more closely
at Sunstein's examples they are revealed as persuasive examples of
commensuration, rather than incommensuration.22 For example, when one
breaks off a social engagement one is, in fact, expected to compensate the
jilted party in some way-perhaps by sending flowers, setting a new date,
or offering to pick up the tab the next time. One would be considered a
boor not to. Moreover, rather than being unusual or insulting, employers
regularly offer, and employees regularly negotiate, excess compensation
for unusual expenditures of the employees' time-and rightfully so.
Indeed, in contradiction to Sunstein, I would expect that most employees
would be angered and insulted if their employers did not offer to
recompense the employees for their time. Expecting someone to toil for
you without compensation is exploitation, if not slavery.
Johnston persuasively notes that whether or not Sunstein is correct that
it is "uncommon for one neighbor to offer to pay another to mow her
lawn.., it would be equally uncommon for the neighbor not to offer to
pay her neighbor's son or daughter to do the job.2 3 I know that I
appreciated being asked to mow my neighbors' lawns, babysit their kids,
walk their dogs, feed their cats, water their plants and do other chores to
earn spending money as a young girl. Sunstein might counter that he
expressly limited his hypothesis to an "adult" offeree for whom "the
request embodies an improper conception of what the relationship is, or of
percentage, if not the majority, of authors and students in this country, let alone parents in traditional
or "third world" countries in which children are, quite literally, the only retirement program available.
18. Id. at 786.
19. Id. at 786.
20. Id. at 787.
21. Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 352 (1986), quoted in Richard Wagner, Does
Incommensurability Matter: In Commensurability and Public Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1287, 1291
(1998).
22. Jason Scott Johnston, Million-Dollar Mountains: Prices, Sanctions, and the Legal Regulation
of Collective Social and Environmental Goods, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1327, 1332-34 (1998).
23. Id. at 1332.
[Vol. 15:347
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/4
Schroeder
the attitude with which neighbors render services for each other. The
impropriety remains even if the offeree ordinarily would regard the
offered wage as a fair price for an hour of mowing services. '24 In this
example, Sunstein implicitly assumes that his neighbor is a well-to-do
professional like himself who would be insulted if asked to perform a
menial task for money. I suspect that the primary reason why Sunstein
claims that the offer would be insulting even if the neighbor offered to pay
him a fair price for mowing services is because Sunstein can charge a
much higher hourly rate for legal services and is not accustomed to
performing physical labor. In contrast, if the neighbor were a
groundskeeper--or out of work-he might be delighted, rather than
insulted, by such a cash offer. I know that if one of my neighbors offered
to pay me my usual hourly rate to act as an expert witness in a commercial
litigation I would be far from insulted. Rather, I would be flattered.
Referring work is one of the things professional friends do for each other.
Indeed, I would be upset only if my neighbor asked me to do significant
legal work without offering to compensate me.
Johnston maintains that "[w]hat the examples tell us is not that there are
incommensurable goods, but that ... at least some of us prefer not to
exchange some things for money, or at least not too explicitly....
That is, the very interesting issue raised by Sunstein's examples is not if
or when people should commensurate when making certain decisions, but
why we sometimes consider it socially necessary to disguise bargaining.
That is, perhaps I should rephrase my earlier rhetorical question, "who can
think of trading one's love for money?" as "who would be willing to admit
in public that one would trade one's love for money?"
Eric Posner goes even further and argues that not only do people always
commensurate, but that claims to incommensurability may themselves be
a mere pretense that can be explained in terms of market forces--that is,
there are competitive advantages to be gained by appearing to be
altruistic.26 Eric Posner's argument, perhaps unintentionally, reveals that
all he and his romantic opponents are doing is arguing about what are the
more intuitively appealing descriptions of empirical behavior.
Consequently, he opens up the field for romantics to propose another set
of intuitively appealing counter-examples and counter-explanations. He
admits that he "has not refuted the arguments advanced by philosophers
who believe in the incommensurability of values. Instead it has shown that
the evidence on which they base their arguments-including statements
24. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 787.
25. Johnston, supra note 22, at 1333.
26. He states that "[allthough the incommensurability thesis often describes peoples'
representations about themselves, it does not describe their actual behavior--that is, the choices they
make in everyday life-although their representations sometimes influence their behavior." Eric A.
Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1186(1998).
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people make, and the moral uneasiness they feel about these choices-is
susceptible to another interpretation., 27 That is, just as Posner finds that
the romantic examples are intuitively unconvincing, he implicitly realizes
that he is unlikely to persuade romantics who find his examples and
explanations to be intuitively unattractive.
III. THE KANTIAN ANT1NOMIES
The speculative approach differs from the either/or dilemma posed in
the commensuration debate. In this tradition, the problem of
commensuration has its origins in Kant's concept of"antinomies" set forth
in his Critique of Pure Reason.28 An antinomy is a pair of contradictory
positions that seem equally necessitated by reasoning. As such, an
antinomy seems to be a conflict within logic itself. Kant claims to solve
antinomies by showing that the apparent contradiction between the two
poles is a misconception. When correctly analyzed, they are seen to exist
in a dialectical, rather than a contradictory, relationship.
Kant identifies only four antinomies. Hegel universalizes this idea and
argues that all categories of thought, and, indeed, the entire universe, is in
antinomy. Consequently, all legal and economic categories will
necessarily exhibit the paradoxical non-relation of commensurability and
incommensurability. Lacan applies Hegel's universalization to the
particular example of human thought and what he called the symbolic
order or the "Big Other,', 29 which includes all intersubjective relationships
and social orders. Lacan, as a psychoanalyst, concentrated primarily on
sexuality and language. However, for Lacan, sexuality is not a mater of
anatomy, but a name for the fundamental logical paradox that underlies
the commmensurability debate. In the words of Renata Salecl:
For Lacan, sexual difference is... the name of a deadlock, or a
trauma, or an open question, or something that resists any attempt at
its symbolization. Every translation of sexual difference into a set of
symbolic opposition(s) is doomed to fail .... What we call "sexual
difference" is first and above all the name of a certain fundamental
deadlock inherent in the symbolic order.3°
Consequently, Lacan's analysis of sexuality is relevant to law not
because it is merely analogous to the commensurability debate. Rather, it
27. Id. at 1214.
28. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) (1781).
29. As Renata Selacl says, "le grand Autre (the "Big "Other") is Lacan's designation for the
symbolic order--not only the order of language, in the narrow linguistic sense, but the entire cobweb
of symbolic relations that form the 'substance' of our social being." Renata Selacl, Introduction to
Sexuation, 3 Sic 1,3 (Renata Selacl ed., 2000). 1 explore the implications of analyzing law and
economics as Lacanian symbolic order extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., JEANNE LORRAINE
SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET (forthcoming 2003).
30. Selacl, supra note 29, at 2.
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is on its own terms an attempt to understand not only the antinomy that
characterizes the debate, but also why we continue to engage in such a
hopeless debate. As we shall see, the masculine position is nothing but the
aspect of human reasoning that engages in commensuration, while the
feminine position is nothing but the aspect that denies the adequacy of
commensuration. Just as both the masculine and the feminine are
necessary, albeit logically incompatible, moments of every person's
subjectivity, so are they necessary, albeit logically incompatible, moment
of every legal and economic decision. We can never permanently choose
one and reject the other; we can only vacillate between them.
Nevertheless, all of us, at least temporarily or contingently, adopt a sexual
identity in order to enter the symbolic order and engage in intersubjective
relations.31
A. The Euthanasia of Reason
Kant demonstrates how each antinomy seemingly appears to be an
irresolvable paradox: two propositions both seem to be mutually
inconsistent, yet equally supported by logic. Consequently, proponents of
each pole of the antinomy try to prove its truth by showing the falsity of
the other. Kant argued that such arguments are doomed to degenerate into
alternating assertions that fail to persuade the other side or lead to
resolution. In Kant's words, "while each successfully demonstrates the
falsity of the other, neither is able to establish convincingly its own
truth. 32 One cannot, therefore, logically decide between the two and the
debate continues to seesaw indefinitely.
These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a battle-
field, where that side obtains the victory which has been permitted to
make the attack, and he is compelled to yield who has been
unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. And hence,
champions of ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are
certain to carry away the crown of victory, if they only take care to
have the right to make the last attack and are not obliged to sustain
another onset from their opponents.33
31. Sexual identity per se is beyond the scope of this Article. It is a common misinterpretation to
conclude from the fact that Lacan identifies two sexual positions that his theory is heterosexist (Judith
Butler is the probably the most prominent proponent of this position). As should become clear from
my analysis in this Article, I believe that Lacan's idea of sexual difference is the Hegelian assertion
that contradiction is universal applied to subjectivity. This does not mean that there are two, and only
two, "normal" ways for this contradiction to manifest itself in empirical sexual experience. Rather, I
believe that it implies that although there are only two Lacanian sexes (in the sense that there are only
two poles), these abstract sexes can be manifested empirically in a potentially infinite number of ways.
Indeed, as a Lacanian, I do not find homosexuality, transexuailtiy, intersexuality, etc. to be difficult to
understand. What is difficult to explain is the persistence of the empirical norm of traditional
heterosexuality.
32. JOAN COPJEC, READ MY DESIRE: LACAN AGAINST THE HISTORICISTS 218 (1994).
33.KANT, supra note 28, at 239-40.
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As such, this battle can never be finally determined, and should be given
up. Kant warns that the insistence on maintaining either of these one-sided
illusions is disastrous to discourse. It inevitably leads to either "a
despairing skepticism, or ... an obstinate persistence in certain assertions,
without granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. 34 In
Kant's memorable turn of phrase, either result--skepticism or zealotry-is
"the Euthanasia of pure reason." 35 Kant suggests that rather than
continuing this sterile debate, "[p]erhaps, after [the opponents] have
wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the nothingness
of their cause of quarrel, and part as good friends.
3 6
This is the structure of the debate about commensurability and
incommensurability. Both sides of the argument assume that their two
positions are contradictories. Utilitarians assume they can prove
commensurability by disproving the supposedly incommensurable
examples offered by romantics, and romantics try to prove
incommensurability by disproving that certain alternatives can be
commensurated.
Kant seeks to save pure reason from this undeserved fate. Consequently,
he needs to find a way to break free from this sterile iteration. He does this
by challenging the basic assumptions about the nature of the antinomies
adopted by the proponents of both poles. If one could discard these
assumptions, then the apparent paradox would fall away. In other words,
Kant proposes a new way of looking at contradiction that Hegel will
eventually develop into dialectic reasoning and Lacan will propose as the
explanation of sexual difference.
Kant claims to solve his antinomies by showing that while certain
propositions might at first blush seem to be logically irreconcilable,
further reflection will show that they are not in contradictory opposition at
all. Contradictories are two propositions that are not merely mutually
exclusive, but which also form the entire universe of choice such that they
exhaust the universe of possibilities. Consequently, "one is the simple
denial of the other [which implies that] the truth of one establishes the
falsity of the other and vice versa., 37 If Kant can show that there are
heretofore unrecognized alternatives to the thesis and antithesis, then they
would no longer be contradictories in the sense that it would be logically
possible for both poles to be true, or for both be false. To understand
Kant's argument it is helpful to take a brief look his analysis of two of his
antinomies.
34. Id. at 231.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 240.
37. COPJEC, supra note 32, at 218.
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B. The Mathematical Antinomies
Kant identifies four antinomies. Each Kantian antinomy contrasts two
apparently contradictory binary poles. The thesis of each antinomy is
dogmatic-it is derived purely from reason.38 In contrast, each antithesis is
empirical-it is based on experience as well as reason.39 Kant further
divides his four antinomies into two dyads: the mathematical and
dynamical antinomies. The reason for Kant's peculiar terminology does
not concern us here. What does concern us is that he believes the two
types of antinomies can be solved in two different ways.
Simplistically put, Kant "solves" the mathematical antinomies by
showing that the apparent conflict between the thesis and antithesis is false
because neither alternative is true. That is possible because they do not
exhaust the possibilities that could exist. In other words, the two poles of
the mathematical antinomies are not contradictories, but merely contraries
in dialectic relationship.
In a dialectic opposition, one contrary merely denies the truth of the
other solution, but this negation "does not exhaust all the possibilities but
leaves behind something on which it does not pronounce. 40 There is at
least one alternative beyond the scope of the two poles. Consequently,
"rather than despairing over the fact that we cannot chose between the two
alternatives, we must come to the realization that we need not choose,
since both alternatives are false. ' Let us look at an example.
Each of Kant's four antinomies involves a cosmological issue that
concerned philosophers in the late eighteenth century.42 The thesis of the
first mathematical antinomy is that the world has a beginning and end and
is limited in time and space.43 Its antithesis is that the world is eternal and
infinite.44 Kant argues that one does not have to decide whether the world
is either infinite or finite, because there is a third category that he calls
"indefiniteness. ' '4 The concepts of infinity and finitude implicit in the
38. KANT, supra note 28, at 236-37.
39. Id. at 266.
40. COPJEC, supra note 32, at 219.
41. Id. at 218.
42. They are 1) the world has a beginning and end/the world is infinite and eternal with no limits
in time or space; 2) there are indivisible simples in the world/everything in the world is infinitely
divisible; 3) freedom is possible/everything in the world is subject to the causal laws of nature; and 4)
there is a necessary cause of the world (God)/there is no necessary cause.
43. KANT, supra note 28, at 241.
44. Id.
45. Kant gives the example of the geometrical concept of a line. When
we produce a straight line--it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum; because the
former means, produce it as far as you please, the second, you must not cease to produce it; the
expression in infinitum is, when we are speaking of the power to do it, perfectly correct, for we
can always make it longer if we please-on to infinity. And this remark holds good in all cases
when we speak of a progressus, that is, an advancement from the condition to the conditioned;
this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity.
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antinomy both depend on certain simplistic assumptions about what it
means for the world to exist. Kant-presaging Lacan's notorious
pronouncements that the Woman46 and the Big Other (i.e., the symbolic
order)47 do not exist-argues that "the world cannot and does not exist."48
That is, the usual understanding of "existence" is a stable state with
definite borders. The world, in contrast, is a dynamic, changing, evolving
entity. Because there is a third alternative, neither pole of the antinomy is
proven by disproving the other.
C. The Dynamical Antinomies
Kant "solves" the two dynamical antinomies in a different way. He
argues that "no real contradiction exists between them, and that,
consequently, both may be true. 49
For example, the thesis of the third antinomy (which is also the first
dynamical antinomy) is that freedom is possible because the causal laws
of nature cannot explain everything.5° The antithesis is that every
phenomenon is subject to the causal laws of nature and, therefore, freedom
is impossible.51 Kant argues that both sides of the third antinomy are true,
but of different aspects of the world.52 In making his argument Kant relies
on his well known distinction between noumena and the phenomena.
A complete discussion of this distinction is beyond the scope of this
Article. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that the empirical world
Id. at 289. Kant admits that in the case of a line, the difference between infinity and indefiniteness is
"a mere piece of subtlety," but he believes that it has significance elsewhere, as in the analysis of the
antinomies. Id. Hegel famously criticizes Kant's definition of infinity (and one more) as a false or bad
infinity, and formulates a very different definition of a "true" infinity. Hegel discusses "infinity" in
G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 137-56 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969). This debate, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article.
46. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN BOOK XX: ON FEMININE SEXUALITY,
THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE (ENCORE) 1972-73 72-74 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Bruce
Fink trans., 1998).
47. JACQUES LACAN, SEMINAIRE LIVRE XVII: L'ENVERS DE LA PSYCHANALYSE 74 (Jacques-
Alain Miller ed., 1991); Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimite (Elisabeth Doisneau ed., Francoise Massardier-
Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74, 81
(March Bracher et al. trans., 1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian
Analysis of Legal Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15, 74-75 (2000). 1 will discuss what
Lacan means by these extraordinary pronouncements infra in text accompanying notes 97-99.
48. COPJEC, supra note 32, at 220. In Kant's words:
If the world is a whole existing in its self, it must be either finite or infinite. But it is neither
finite nor infinite-as has been shown on the one side by the thesis, on the other side by the
antithesis. Therefore the world--the content of all phenomena-is not a whole existing in itself.
It follows that phenomena are nothing, apart from our representations.
KANT, supra note 28, at 286.
49. Id. at 316.
50. Id. at 252.
51. Id.
52. 1 give a more detailed account of his argument in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block:
Freedom, Rationality and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (2002); Jeanne L.
Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and the Essence of Right: Metaphor and
Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
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that we can know through our senses and experience consists of
phenomena. The phenomena are mere temporary, contingent appearance.
Kant posits that there must be a true, eternal, and necessary essence
underlying the phenomena which he refers to as the "thing-in-itself' or the
noumena. Although our intellect can propose that noumena must exist, we
can have no direct knowledge of the noumena precisely because they are
not empirical.53
Kant asserts that the empirical antithesis of the third antinomy (i.e. that
everything is subjected to the causal laws of nature) is only true of the
phenomenal (i.e. natural, empirical) world-indeed, it is a truism.5 4 If
phenomena were not caused, they would be necessary, not contingent, and
eternal, not temporal-i.e. they would be noumena. 55 The dogmatic
thesis--that freedom (i.e. uncaused action, spontaneity) is possible-is
equally true with respect to the noumenal world.56 Indeed, if noumena
were caused, then they would be contingent and temporal, not necessary
and eternal-i.e. they would be phenomena.
One might be tempted to conclude from this that freedom is a mere
theoretical abstraction (in Kantian terminology, transcendental).57
Freedom could only exist in the world of the intellect and not the sensible
empirical world in which we live. Kant argues, however, that it is at least
theoretically possible for freedom to have empirical existence (in Kantian
terminology, for freedom to be "practical"). This is because nature can
insist only that the empirical world be subject to her law of causality, but
she cannot limit the source of causality. The cause of empirical
phenomena need not itself be empirical (phenomenal). The free,
spontaneous noumena can be the cause of phenomena.58 Individual men,
as empirical creatures, are phenomenal, and therefore, subject to the laws
of nature. 59 Man's reason, however, is noumenal and, therefore, free.60
Rationality, the noumenal essence of mankind, might therefore, cause
empirical persons to act freely in the world.61 The empirical effects of
noumenal freedom is what Kant calls "practical" freedom.
62
53. Robert Merrihew Adams, Introduction to IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON vi, ix (Allen Wood ed., George Di Giovanni trans., 1998); Schroeder,
supra note 52, at 285.
54. KANT, supra note 28, at 302; Schroeder, supra note 52, at 286.
55. KANT, supra note 28 at 302-03; Schroeder, supra note 52, at 287.
56. KANT, supra note 28, at 302; Schroeder, supra note 52, at 286.
57. Schroeder, supra note 52, at 286
58. "Is it not ... possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected
with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this empirical causality may be itself
the effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality--its connection with natural causes remaining
nevertheless intact?" KANT, supra note 28, at 306; see also Schroeder, supra note 52, at 287-88.
59. KANT, supra note 28, at 307.
60. Id.
61. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims only to show that practical freedom is
theoretically possible. In his Critique of Practical Reason he seeks either to prove that practical reason
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The persuasiveness of Kant's specific analysis of his four antinomies
does not concern us here. It has been widely criticized even by Kantians.
63
Hegel doesn't spare the vitriol when he declares Kant's argument "a
whole nest ... of faulty procedure." 64 This is why I do not dwell in detail
on his specific antinomies, but instead only discuss his general approach.
Nevertheless, whatever Kant's inadequacies, his identification of the
misleading nature of antinomies can be seen as the basis of the Hegelian
dialectic, specifically, and much of speculative thought, generally.
Consequently, before Hegel demolishes Kant's account, he first praises it
as "the downfall of previous metaphysics." 65 Kant's contribution in this
regard is his invitation for us to rethink our preconceptions about apparent
contradiction. Moreover, as I discuss later,66 Kant specifically anticipated
one aspect of the commesurability debate of law and economics.
IV. THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC
If Hegel is Kant's harshest critic, this is because he is Kant's most
sincere student. He takes Kant seriously on his own terms. Lacan, in turn,
will not only take Kant and Hegel seriously, he will suggest the
implications of their theory for the purposes of language, sexuality, and
law. Although Hegel's theory differs greatly from Kant's, it is grounded in
the issues raised and analysis proposed by Kant. Indeed, Hegel's Greater
Logic can be read as a long response to the Critique of Pure Reason.
Consequently, to understand Hegel's notion of the relationship of quantity
(commensuration) and quality (incommensuration) that he developed in
the Greater Logic, it is useful to first take a brief look at Kant.
Hegel believes Kant does not grasp the full implications of the
antinomies. First, the number of antinomies cannot be limited to the four
identified by Kant. As mentioned above, the first Kantian antinomy asks
how far the universe extends outward: does it extend infinitely, or does it
have boundaries in time and space? The second antinomy, which I have
not discussed, is the inverse of this question. It asks how far the universe
extends inward: is the universe comprised of discrete, indivisible entities
does in fact exist, or that we have very good reason to think that it is likely to exist. Kantian scholars
disagree as to the success of this latter enterprise.
62. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 138 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996).
63. For example, Henry Allison prefaces his half-hearted defense of Kant's analysis of the
antinomies by stating that his "goal is to show that, although hardly free from difficulty, they are not
as hopelessly confused as Kant's critics generally assume." HENRY ALLISON, KANT'S
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: AN INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE 36 (1983).
64. HEGEL, supra note 45, at 195. Hegel accuses Kant of committing the logical error of
quaternio terminorum--a kind of failed syllogism. See David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of
Quantity, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027 (2002).
65. HEGEL, supra note 64, at 190.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 152-69.
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or atoms, which he called "simples," or is everything infinitely divisible?67
If the entire external and internal scope of the world are antinomies,
doesn't this imply that the world and everything in it are also characterized
by antinomy? Or, more accurately, it implies that reality consists of one
fundamental antinomy--or dialectic--that is actualized in a limitless
number of both fundamental and empirical variations in the world. This
realization constitutes the basis for Hegel's speculative logic to which I
turn shortly.
Hegel concludes that all concepts necessarily require their own negation
as the condition of their possibility. Therefore, the universe is in a state of
contradiction. If antinomy is universal, then no specific antinomy is a
problem to be solved. Rather, antinomy, as a necessary fact of the world,
is a process to be studied, understood and dealt with. Morality is nothing
but the dealing with and the making of choices when this dispute cannot
be resolved as a logical matter. Kant is correct that every specific
contradiction is unstable and must eventually go under. The resolution
itself, however, will also be unstable and lead to a new contradiction. This
means that the universe is dynamic-in a constant state of becoming and
ceasing to be as each contradiction is temporarily resolved only to reveal
new contradictions to be temporarily resolved, ad infinitum. Kant intuited
this point in his analysis of the first antinomy. However, he did not have
the courage to face the implication of his analysis-one that disproves one
of the most basic axioms of his metaphysics: there can be no eternal, static
parallel universe of noumena beyond contradiction.
Hegel's entire logic is based on this fundamental proposition that all
intelligible concepts-which means all legal concepts-are characterized
by constituent internal antinomies or "contradictions. 68 The entire world
is characterized by contradiction. Contradiction "is not to be taken merely
as an abnormality which only occurs here and there, but is rather the
negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-
movement ... ,,69 For the purposes of this Article, the point is that both
sides of the commensurability debate assume they can solve policy
67. Hegel criticizes Kant for not realizing that the first and second antinomies are really asking
the same question. HEGEL, supra note 74, at 192.
68. Carlson, supra note 64.
69. HEGEL, supra note 64, at 438. Hegel is particularly critical of those philosophers who try to
deny or do away with contradiction. He says about Kant (specifically with respect to Kant's attempt to
resolve his second antinomy):
that the world is in its own self not self-contradictory, not self-sublating, but that it is only
consciousness in its intuition and in the relation of institution to understanding and reason that is
a self-contradictory being. It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove
contradiction from it and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is
allowed to remain unresolved. In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure
contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows how to resolve it. But, the so-called world.., is
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disputes by proving that their side, and only their side, of the debate is
correct. To a speculative thinker, however, this debate is inept precisely
because it is logically impossible to resolve. Both sides are equally right in
identifying a true moment in their position and equally wrong in thinking
that their position disproves the other side.
To Hegel, the very instability of contradiction is its strength. Hegel
rejects the classical view of the universe as static, or cyclical. This is the
world that Kant called the noumena. Hegel, working within the Christian
theological tradition, sees the world as both dynamic and
progressive-moving through different, and higher, stages. Contradiction
is precisely the engine of change in this dynamic ever-changing world.
Hegel's analysis also requires that we reject Kant's distinction between
mathematical and dynamical antinomies. As we have seen, Kant thinks he
"solves" the mathematical antinomies by arguing how both poles are
equally false, and thinks he solves the mathematical antinomies by arguing
how both poles are equally true. Hegel argues, instead, that both poles of
all antinomies are equally false and true. That is, each pole reflects a true
moment of the underlying concept, even as each is only a partial and
incomplete account of that concept. To understand this requires a quick
digression into Hegel's speculative logical method.
A. Speculative Logic
Hegel's speculative logic can be seen as a reworking and
universalization of Kant's antinomies. As we have seen, each Kantian
antinomy starts with a dogmatic thesis (reached purely through reason)
contrasted with an empirical antithesis (which was based on reason
applied to experience). Kant tries to resolve this apparent contradiction by
showing that the relationship between the thesis and antithesis is not
contradictory, but dialectic.
Hegel proceeds somewhat differently. He starts his analysis of every
philosophic concept with a thesis reached by a thought process he calls
"understanding--the intuition that 'immediately' perceives a concept as an
uncomplicated entity. 7° Understanding is "common sense.' It abstracts
an immediate affirmative moment of a concept and assumes that it is its
entire truth.72
An antithesis to the understanding's thesis is created by a process he
calls "dialectic reasoning." Dialectic reasoning sees that all concepts are,
in fact, mediated "and the understanding has merely isolated the
affirmative existent part of the concept., 73 It points out that the thesis
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always leaves out, and therefore implies, its negation. Consequently, "[a]s
its name suggests, dialectical reasoning always reads double. 7 4 The
process of understanding is relatively simplistic and static; dialectical
reasoning is more advanced. Because it opposes the thesis to the
antithesis, it is dynamic, creating a modulation between these two poles.
Nevertheless, as understanding's negation, dialectical reasoning mirrors its
errors.75 It opposes to understanding's inadequate thesis, an equally
inadequate oppositional abstraction.76 In David Gray Carlson's words,
"We have a kind of autism that gets us nowhere because drawing attention
to the lack in understanding merely replicates the understanding's own
error."77 In other words, at the level of dialectical reasoning we face the
potential "euthanasia of reason" that Kant warns would result from the
simplistic analysis of the four antinomies and that I identify as the ping-
pong nature of the debate about commensuration and incommensuration.
Thesis and antithesis threaten to engage in an endless, unprofitable
exchange of insults.
Hegel, like Kant, seeks a new way of viewing thesis and antithesis other
than through the sterile modulation of immediate contradictories. This
third way is speculative reasoning. Speculative reasoning "brings forth the
truth that between the two extremes.., there is difference. 78 Difference
is, paradoxically, what the two extremes have in common. Speculative
reasoning recognizes this difference as a surplus implied by the thesis and
antithesis. This form of reasoning is "speculative" in the sense of
investment: it is the excess return on-the beyond of-the thesis and
antithesis.79 The synthesis reached through speculative reasoning is higher
than the thesis and antithesis. "It affirms their difference ... as such
(which paradoxically, is the same identical lack in each of the subordinate
terms)., 80 The synthesis is more than the sum of its parts, because it
recognizes a universality, or unity, between the two. This is, however, a
negative unity, "precisely because the unity is not to be found in the parts.
It must be added (i.e. positivized).'
Speculative reasoning does not so much "solve" as it does temporarily
and contingently "resolve" the contradiction in a process which Hegel
called Aujhebung. This is awkwardly translated into English as
"sublation," an obscure term borrowed from chemistry. Hegel adopts this
74. Id. at 445.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 446.
78. Id. at 447.
79. Id.
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relatively common, but ambiguous, German word because it paradoxically
means both negation and preservation.
82
Speculative reasoning shows that both the understanding and the
dialectic are simultaneously false and true. That is, every contradiction is
shown to be both a mathematical and a dynamic antinomy. Each says
something true about the concept, but insofar as it claims to tell the whole
truth, it lies because it denies the other's equally valid moment of truth.
The "sublation" of the two concepts leads to a third concept that reflects
the true aspect of both, thereby arriving at a purer and more complete
truth.
By revealing the inadequacy of both the understanding and the dialectic,
speculative reasoning negates them. In so far as speculative reasoning
recognizes the moments of truth of the understanding and the dialectic, it
preserves them. Sublation, therefore, continues to recognize the
contradiction between the understanding and dialectic even as it resolves
this distinction. This must be the case because the speculative is nothing
but the sublation of the understanding and the dialectic. They are the
building blocks of the speculative. If these building blocks were to be
completely negated, the speculative would itself cease to be. This is why
Hegel's philosophy is based on the insistence on the identity of identity
(the thesis and the antithesis can be resolved into a single synthesis) and
difference (yet an essential moment of difference between the two
remains). In other words, sublation includes, and occurs at, all three steps
of the logic.
I have said that speculative reasoning only contingently resolves
contradiction. If contradiction could be permanently resolved, the world
would become eternal, unchanging, necessary and essential. That is, the
phenomena would eventually graduate to noumena. Speculative reason,
however, preserves a moment of contradiction which the understanding
must resolve by an immediate proposition. As such, dialectic reasoning
will show that this new understanding will imply and generate its own
negation and the process will continue indefinitely.
B. Quality and Quantity
Hegel considers the supposed contradiction between commensuration
and incommensuration, in his analysis of the dialectical relationship
between what he called quantity and quality. Hegel fully recognized the
difficulty of this analysis-over one-third of the Greater Logic is devoted
to a discussion of quantity, quality and their relationship, which he called
,,measure." 83
82. HEGEL, supra note 64, at 107.
83. Hegel's analysis can be seen as a long criticism of Kant's second mathematical
antinomy--are there indivisible simples in the world, or is everything infinitely divisible.
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Hegel argues that quantity and quality are dialectically
related--simultaneously identical yet different.84 Quantitative changes are
gradual; qualitative changes are sudden. That is, quantity is pure
continuity-the proposition that everything is infinitely
divisible-whereas quality is discrete--the proposition that things can be
reduced to irreducible simples. Something can have more or less of a
quantity, but it either has or does not have a quality. Described this way,
what legal economists call "commensuration"--the idea that everything
can be compared in terms of whether they have more or less of a single
metric-is an example of quantitative difference. The romantic idea of
incommensuration-4hat despite the fact we are sometimes forced into
making tragic choices, certain values are unique-is an example of
qualitative difference. That is, as my colleague Kyron Huigens has so
forcefully argued in his defense of an Aristotelian, anti-consequentialist
understanding of incommensurability, it is precisely the existence of an
unsublated remainder of qualitative difference that cannot be completely
reduced to and captured by quantitative value, that renders choice
"tragic. ' '85
The Hegelian concept of the identity of identity and difference,
however, means that quantitative change reveals qualitative change, and
vice versa.
Hegel gives the familiar example of hair loss to illustrate the
paradoxical relationship between quality and quantity.86 As we are all well
aware, society makes a strong qualitative distinction between baldness and
hairiness but within this distinction lies a paradox. On the one hand, a
mere quantitative change in the amount of a man's hair is not per se a
qualitative change-a hairy man who loses one hair remains hairy. At
some point, however, quantitative change becomes qualitative-if the man
loses too many hairs he will be considered bald. It is not, logically
possible to determine the exact moment when this transition occurs. This
I do not attempt to reproduce Kant's sketchy argument here. Many commentators find it to be a
failure. Indeed, after literally dozens of readings I still find that it consists of a series of non-sequiturs
and was gratified to discover Hegel's assessment of it as logical error. See supra note 63. For our
purposes it is sufficient to know that Kant concludes that the issue is undecidable. This undecidability
is not, however, because of the nature of the object itself. Rather, Kant believes that it flows from the
very internal limitations of reason itself. In other words, this contradiction is not "objective" (in the
object itself) but "subjective" (in our ability to understand the object).
Hegel lambastes Kant for lack of intellectual fortitude. As explained in the quote set forth supra in
note 69. Kant could not face the possibility that the world itself is contradictory (mere phenomena with
no underlying noumena). Consequently, he thought that the perception of contradiction in the world
must be an illusion resulting from the weakness of his intellect.
84. The following discussion closely parallels my account of quantity and quality in Schroeder.
JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE
FEMININE 305-09 (1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-Day: On the Impossibility of Takings
Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L. J. 1531, 1555-56 (1996).
85. Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L. REV. 537,
545-47 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)).
86. HEGEL, supra note 64, at 335; Schroeder, supra note 84, at 1554-55.
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is because (by definition) the identification of a specific point of transition
is to assign a quality to the transition point. Rather, this distinction is a
matter of judgment-pragmatic reasoning. You and I may disagree
whether a man with the receding hairline is bald or merely balding.
As I have explained elsewhere:
Quantity is the sublation of quality: quantity is what results when one
overcomes quality's finitude. Finitude is quality's dependence on
otherness; i.e. the sense that a quality can only be understood in terms
of what it is not, of what is fenced off. Because quantity is the
expulsion of otherness, the quantity achieved by sublating any one
quality is indistinguishable and continuous with all other "ones" that
similarly result from sublating all other qualities (determinate
beings). In other words, qualities are plural, but quantity is unity. By
definition, there must be many qualities, each separate and
distinguishable from the others in the sense that the quality of
baldness is different from the quality of hairiness, or for that matter,
the qualities of being hot, sweet, or whatever. In contradistinction, the
concept of more or less is the same regardless of whether we are
talking about more of this, or less of that-whether it be the number
of hairs on a man's head, the temperature, or sweetness. Quantity is,
therefore, indifferent to quality.
In simple English, quality is differentiation, quantity is
commensuration. Quality is difference; quantity is identity. The
identity of quality and quantity is the famous Hegelian doctrine of the
identity of identity and difference. Qualities are the differences of self
from other. Quantity, in contradistinction, is what self and other have
in common. Qualitative difference is a matter of is or is not.
Quantitative difference is a matter of more or less. Quality asks "is it
X or Y?" Quantity asks "how much Z do X and Y have?" This is why
changes in quality are sudden even though changes in quantity are
gradual. Nevertheless, changes in quantity eventually lead to changes
in quality. This relationship between quality and quantity is called
",measure."87
To say that quantity is the "sublation" of quality means, in Hegel's
difficult terminology, that quantity temporarily overcomes the internal
contradictions within the concept of quality and, therefore, supersedes
quality. This fact is intuited by those commensurabilists who point out
that, in fact, despite our denials we overcome supposedly
incommensurable qualitative differences all the time when we make
choices--to choose between two options on other than purely random
grounds (like flipping the coins), is to compare them quantitatively. But,
the incommensurabilists are equally correct when they intuit that the fact
that choices are made does not mean that qualitative differences can or
87. Schroeder, supra note 84, at 1556-57; SCHROEDER, supra note 84, at 307-08.
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should be subsumed into quantity. The rigid commensurabilist position
shows a lack of understanding of sublation.
As I have already introduced, sublation-the overcoming or resolving
of contradictions-should not be confused with obliteration. Sublation is
preservation as well as negation. In other words, true commensurability
must always respect and preserve incommensurability-qualitative
difference must always be recognized for true quantitative equality to be
realized. This dynamic can be seen in the Hegelian analysis of market
exchange which I will discuss shortly.
V. LACAN
If Hegel universalizes Kantian antinomy to encompass the entire
intelligible world, then Lacan internalizes it as a theory of the psyche.
Indeed, Lacan posits that subjectivity is nothing but a fundamental
constituent antinomy. This antinomy is the sexual impasse: the necessary
impossible relation-or non-relation---between the masculine and the
feminine. What I intend to show is that Lacan's sexual impasse is
precisely the impasse between commensurability and incommensurability.
Just as the subject is defined as the incommensurability of masculine and
feminine, so the universe of human values is defined as the split between
commensurability and incommensurability. This means that Lacan's
theory of sexuality is a theory of the symbolic order as a whole, and
therefore, a theory of law and of economics.
A. The Symbolic Nature of Sexuality
Psychoanalytically speaking, sexuality cannot be reduced to anatomic
fact. Sexuality is a linguistic or "symbolic" position. Specifically,
sexuality is precisely the argumentative position one takes with respect to
the dialectic between commensurability and incommensurability.88 Lacan,
however, rewrites this irreconcilable debate as the linguistic tropes of
metaphor and metonymy, respectively.
The fundamental thesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis is that the subject is
split.89 This does not mean that the subject has (or once had) an
affirmative content that has been broken in half. Lacan implicitly follows
in Hegel's footsteps in thinking that the world is constituted by a
necessary contradiction or fundamental negativity, such that there is no
noumenal essence that underlies appearance. Consequently, Lacanian
subjectivity is conceived as a radical negativity-personality is constituted
88. COPJEC, supra note 32, at 215.
89. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 137 (1990).
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by that radical internal rift which Kant called antinomy. Consequently, the
phrase "the subject is split" is not a description but a definition. 90
Because the subject is split, he desires. Specifically he desires not to be
split, to be whole. Consequently, when Lacan posits the split subject he is
repeating Hegel's insight that subjectivity, as pure negativity, is nothing
but desire. Note that by definition, this desire can never be satisfied in the
sense that if the subject became whole she would no longer be a subject.9'
The subject is also split within three orders that Lacan called the
symbolic, the imaginary and the real.92 The symbolic-which will be our
focus, is the social, intersubjective order that includes language, law and
sexuality. The imaginary is, as its name suggests, the order of imagery and
fantasy. The confusingly named "real" is not physical reality per se,93 but
our sense that an objective world that cannot be fully captured in words
and pictures exists beyond our subjective experience.94 That is, properly
understood, Lacanianism is a rejection of the silly proposition often
ascribed to post-modernists that there is no objective reality or truth. What
Lacan questions is man's capacity as a conscious being to have direct
access to the object world or knowledge of the complete truth. The instant
we become conscious of our sensuous experience of the object world, we
have already reinterpreted through words or images. By exploring the
limitations of human knowledge, Lacan is working within such traditional
90. In his excellent introduction to Lacan's theory of the subject, Bruce Fink, one of the current
translators of Lacan's seminars into English, gives an unusually clear description of Lacan's notion of
the split subject. The metaphor of the split subject inevitably suggests a positive content (subjectivity),
albeit with a rupture in the center. Lacan's point, which I believe exactly reflects Hegel's
understanding of both human personality and Geist, is more extreme than this. The split is subjectivity.
BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 45 (1995).
91. An empirical human being, however, can become desubjectified. This is not because her
desire can ever be filled, but because she can give up on her desire. Psychoanalytic "cure" is nothing
but the replacement of desire with the urge Lacan called "drive." Jeanne L. Schroeder, Can Lawyer's
Be Cured?: Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence and the Lacanian Death Drive, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 925,
957-58. Consequently, another term for cure is "subjective destitution." In Zizek's words:
"[S]ubjective destitution" changes the register from desire to drive. Desire is historical and
subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one object to
another since I do not actually desire what I want. What I actually desire is to sustain desire
itself, to postpone the dreaded moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, involves a
kind of interest satisfaction that always finds its way; drive is nonsubjectivized ("acephalous").
SLAVOJ ZIZEK/F.W.J. VON SCHELLING, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM/THE AGES OF THE WORLD 80
(1997).
92. See Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II, in JACQUES LACAN AND THE tCOLE FREUDIENNE,
FEMININE SEXUALITY 27, 31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985);
JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN. BOOK I: FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 80 (J-
A. Miller ed., J. Forrester trans., 1988). See generally, GROSZ, supra note 89, at 10. In one of Lacan's
last seminars, he uses the metaphor of a "Borromean Knot" to describe the relationships between these
three orders. STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO 33
(1983); SLAVOJ 71ZEK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR
CULTURE 32 (1992).
93. In Grosz's words: "The Real is not however the same as reality; reality is lived as and known
through imaginary and symbolic representations." GROSZ, supra note 89, at 34.
94. "The Real cannot be experienced as such: it is capable of representation or conceptualization
only through the reconstructive or inferential work of the imaginary and symbolic orders. Lacan
himself refers to the Real as 'the lack of a 'lack."' Id.
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Western intellectual traditions as the philosophy of science and Christian
theology.
A corollary of the proposition that the subject is split is that the
intersubjective social order of the symbolic--sometimes called the big
Other-is also split. In Lacan's notorious formulation, "the Other does not
exist." 95 Lacan is not proposing that there is no such thing as law,
language, or sexuality, or that the social order does not function. Rather he
is expanding on Kant's and Hegel's earlier insights that the symbolic order
is characterized by logically necessary paradoxes or antinomies.
As discussed,96 Kant "solves" the first antinomy (the world is finite,
with a beginning and an end-the world is infinite and eternal), by
positing that neither category applies to the world because these are the
characteristics of existence. The world, however, does not "exist." That is,
the world as a whole is not a static thing so that one could potentially
measure its borders, or lack thereof. The world is indefinite-an open and
ever changing thing that is always coming to be and ceasing to be. Hegel
universalizes this insight, even going so far as to propose that the very
concept of being that Kant presupposed was simplistic and incoherent.
Being contains non-being and is quickly sublated into becoming-a
ceaseless coming to be and ceasing to be.
Lacan agrees with Hegel and posits that not only the world, but the
subject and the symbolic order (the Other) do not "exist" in the simplistic
way that Kant imagines existence. The symbolic order is not objective in
the senses of pre-existing, necessary, static, or closed. As a human
creation it is intersubjective and therefore contingent, temporary,
changing, and open. Rather than "existing" it is constituted by a radical
negativity of fundamental antinomies and dialectical contradictions.
B. The Masculine and the Feminine
Sexuality is nothing but the subject's reaction to the proposition that the
subject and the big Other are split. On the one hand, this proposition is
extremely disturbing. We desire to have integrity, to be whole, to have our
desires filled. Yet, Lacanian theory states that all of these goals are
structurally impossible for the conscious speaking subject. On the other
hand, this proposition can be liberating. The fact that the subject is not a
completed, affirmative existing thing but a radical, split negativity means
that the subject is pure potentiality. As Kant and Hegel argue, the
incompleteness of the subject is the very pre-condition to human
freedom.97
95. Miller, supra note 47, at 81.
96. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
97. In Kant's moving metaphor, if man was truly complete and did know the true moral law,
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The two "sexes" are two reactions to the Lacanian proposition that the
subject is split. In other words, Lacan's theory of sexuality is not merely
relevant to the commensurability debate by analogy. Rather, it is his name
for the debate.
The masculine position cannot bear the disturbing implications of split
subjectivity and so he tries to deny the truth of the proposition. The
masculine position uses a number of strategies to try to convince himself
and others that he is not really split. In other words, the masculine is the
part of personality that insists on commensurability (the ability to contain
and measure the world).
Another term for the split of subjectivity is "castration., 98  The
masculine subject tries to claim that he is not castrated because he has the
"phallus"-a technical term defined negatively as the lack of a lack or that
which is the opposite of our constituent split.99 Forced to confront the
concept of split subjectivity, the masculine subject adopts a second
avoidance mechanism. He admits that other subjects-specifically
feminine subjects--are split. Consequently, the male human being who
takes on the masculine position tries to identify something that he, and
other male persons, has, but which "feminine" persons do not have as
proof that they (women), and not he, are split. Consequently, the male
person tries to reassure himself with the fact that men have penises, and
that women do not, as proof that he has the elusive phallus.
Men do not have the phallus, however, and the phallus is not masculine.
The thing that the split subject supposedly lacks (the hypothesized
negative thing that would fill his hole and make him whole), is only called
the phallus because male human beings falsely claim to have it. l00
In contrast, the feminine subject accepts and internalizes the "fact" that
the subject is split. She understands that the phallus is not something that
If the self were noumenal, then God (a noumenon) would be our equal. God would stand before
our eyes as directly perceivable. We would lose our freedom, if we could directly know God's
law. We would be mere puppets in the thrall of the moral law. Ironically, morality would
become legality, and morality would be thoroughly pathologicat-hat is natural.
Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REv. 653,
667 (2000) (reviewing SLAVOJ 2I1EK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL
ONTOLOGY; SiC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS (Slavoj Zi~ek ed., 1998) and SLAVOJ 212EK, THE
PLAGUE OF FANTASIES (1997))(citations omitted).
98. The terminology reflects the fact that the subject mistakenly feels that he is split because
someone or something (i.e. the Other) did something to him. That is, he imagines that he was once
whole and satisfied until the symbolic order took something away from him. This is obviously false, in
the sense that there is no subjectivity without its constituent split. "That is to say: What precisely is
symbolic castration? It is ... the sense of the loss of something which the subject never possessed in
the first place." 2I2EK, supra note 97, at 15.
99. Lacan has been ridiculed for saying that the phallus is literally (not metaphorically) the
square root of negative one. See, e.g., ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRiCOURT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS (1998). But it is precisely his point that the phallus is that which
remains negative even when multiplied by itself. In his essay Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic
of Desire, Lacan explains the square root of negative one as "what the subject lacks." JACQUES
LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 307, 317 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
100. SCHROEDER, supra note 84, at 87-94.
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one could have to make her complete, but rather the symbol of her own
lack. As the lack of a lack the phallus is doubly negative. Consequently,
the feminine does not claim to have the phallus, rather she steps into the
position of the phallus-both the realization of her own lack of content
and the masculine's object of desire. Of course, if one concentrates on the
disturbing aspects of castration, this position can be extremely
depressing-and indeed depression is thought to be more common among
women than men. 10 1 It can, however, be liberating. As we shall see, the
feminine is the aspect of personality that insists on a moment of
incommensurability.
As I discuss in the next section, the feminine is the potential for
freedom. The masculine position claims that both he and the symbolic
order are complete. This means that the masculine subject is completely
integrated into, and therefore subjected to, the law. The feminine, in
contrast, is the part of personality that is not perfectly so subjected,
precisely because she understands that neither she nor the law is complete.
They are both works in process. This is why Lacan, (perhaps
unconsciously) 10 2 looks backwards to Kant's analysis of the world of his
first antinomy in which he determines that the world does not exist, but is
in a state of becoming and ceasing to be. Lacan, similarly, declares that
not only the Big Other'03 but the Woman (the feminine, per se) do not
exist.104 They do not have a static affirmative presence, but are merely a
contingent negative unity.
Lacan's analysis also looks backwards to Kant's third antinomy. As we
have seen, Kant thought that all phenomena were completely subject to the
causal chains of nature. Similarly, the Lacanian masculine subject is
completely subjected to the chains of law. Kant, thought that practical
freedom was theoretically possible even in the empirical world of
phenomena because a phenomenon might be caused by a noumenon, and
noumena are not completely subject to causality-that is noumena are the
uncaused cause. Although Lacan, like Hegel, does not rely on a distinction
between phenomena and noumena, to Lacan, the feminine, like the
noumena, stands for the possibility of freedom--4hat some aspect of
101. It is thought that clinical depression affects approximately twice as many women as men.
See www.nami.orgfhelpline'women, www. med. umich.edu/womensguide, www.intimacy and
depression.com/brochure, www. aaafp.org/afp/9907000p225. Zifek offers a Lacanian account of
feminine depression in his essay SLAVOJ 2IEK, David Lynch, or the Feminine Depression, THE
METASTASIS OF ENJOYMENT: Six ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND CAUSALITY 113 (1994). He argues that
depression is not something that women fall into, but the "original fact" of the feminine position out of
which women must emerge. Id. at 121. This is because "the philosophical name for this 'depression' is
absolute negativity." Id. at 122. The prevalence of feminine depression does not indicate that women
are more delicate or inferior than men, but that "woman, not man, is the subject par excellance." Id.
102. Lacan is heavily influenced by Kant, and frequently cites him---most famously in his
seventh seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis and his notorious essay Kant With Sade. Jacques
Lacan, Kant with Sade (James B. Swenson, Jr. trans.), 51 OCTOBER 55 (1989).
103. LACAN, supra note 47, at 74. Miller, supra note 47, at 91.
104. LACAN, supra note 46, at 72-74.
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personality is not subjected to the chains of law and is an uncaused
cause. 
105
I have introduced the Lacanian conception of the two sexuated
positions. I will now explain how they require each other. I will then
introduce Lacan's concept of the sexuation of metaphor and metonymy
and how this relates to commensuration and incommensuration.
C. The Paradox of the Sexual Impasse
The masculine and the feminine are, obviously, in contradiction. I have
just shown how the two sexuated positions can be thought of as the two
poles of the third Kantian antinomy---either the subject is bound by law or
she is not. As I discuss in the next section on signification, the sexes can
also be described as the two poles of the antinomy of commensuration and
incommensuration. Lacan implicitly agrees with Hegel that Kant was
wrong in limiting antinomies to the four he identified in his Critique of
Pure Reason. All of the universe is characterized by antinomy, as Hegel
thought. Sexuality is nothing but this central fact of universal antinomy.
Nevertheless, although the two sexes are in opposition, they should not
be thought of as simple negations. The masculine and the feminine are not
yin and yang which together could form a satisfying whole. Nor are they
contradictories. Rather, the masculine and the feminine are two different
ways by which the subject can fail to be a whole in and by him or
herself. 0 6 Consequently, when the masculine and feminine attempt to
come together, they do not fit together like pieces in a jigsaw, but create
an imperfect amalgam with excessive overlaps and inadequate coverage.
As is the case of the physical act of sexual intercourse, psychoanalytic
sexual relations confront us with a baffling juxtaposition of obscene
fulsomeness and embarrassing inadequacy. Sexual climax is always too
much too bear and too little to satisfy. Consequently, another of Lacan's
105. 1 would note at this juncture that Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is often accused of
phallocentrism. I believe that this is a grave misreading. Lacan's is not a misogynistic theory, but a
theory of misogyny in the sense that it tries to explain the persistence of this phenomena. In fact,
Lacan subverts traditional patriarchal gender roles from within. In patriarchy, the archetypical human
being is masculine. In contrast, to Lacan subjectivity is feminine. Men only falsely claim to have the
phallus, which is the symbol of subjectivity. It is only women in their radical negativity who can take
on the role of the phallus and be a subject. As 2ifek rhetorically asks, "[d]oes this not mean that
subjectivity is in its most basic dimension, in an unheard-of-way feminine?"' IZEK , supra note 91,
at 8. See also SCHROEDER, supra note 84, at 326-29. Masculinity can be seen, therefore, as a form of
failed femininity. Or, in Zizek's phrase, "a man is perhaps simply a woman who thinks that she does
exist." SLAVOJ ZI2EK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 75 (1989). See also supra note 101.
106. As Renata Salecl so clearly explains:
Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual difference as the relationship of
two opposite poles which complement each other, together forming the whole of "Man."
"Masculine" and "feminine" are not the two species of the genus Man but rather the two modes
of the subject's failure to achieve the full identity of Man. "Man" and "Woman" together do not
form a whole, since each of them is already in itself a failed whole.
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notorious slogans is "there are no sexual relations"'0 7---sexuality is an
essential non-relation. Once again, the reason this sounds extremely
depressing is because it is.' 0 8 On the one hand, even though subjectivity is
nothing but the longing for wholeness, we can never achieve wholeness
either in the form of integrity within ourselves or perfect union with
another. On the other hand, there is an affirmative, albeit tragic, side of the
sexual impasse. If we could achieve perfect wholeness we would cease to
desire (to want wholeness). Because subjectivity is nothing but the split of
desire, to be fulfilled would be the loss of subjectivity and freedom. The
very fact that desire is always unfulfilled enables us to achieve something
much more precious-love. 10 9 This is why we experience sexual union as
a miracle; it is logically impossible, yet it occurs. If, however, sexual
encounters were ever completely fulfilling, all we could ever do with any
partner is to mate and then (at best) part as friends like dogs and many
other animals.
Each of the two sexes requires the other as its defining dialectic
negative, even as they cannot appear simultaneously. To borrow a
metaphor that Lacan uses in another, albeit related, context, they are two
sides of the same coin.' 10 A coin must have two sides, but at any given
time, the coin must be either heads or tails. To draw parallels from
physics, although light is both particle and wave it cannot be both at the
same time. Similarly, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us that
sub-atomic particles cannot simultaneously have exact position and
momentum. However, to refer once again to another Lacanian metaphor,
the two oppositional sexes are two sides of a mobius strip--each
constantly flows into the other."'
The masculine maintains his fiction that he and the symbolic order are
whole, essential, necessary, objective and not castrated by exporting the
very concept of incompleteness, appearance, contingency, subjectivity and
castration to the feminine. The feminine, indeed, is defined purely
negatively in these terms. Because the masculine cannot accept the
107. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual Difference,
in LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49, 67 (E. Ragland-Sullivan & M. Bracher eds., 1991);
GROSZ, supra note 89, at 137.
108. In Salecl's words:
For Lacan, sexual difference is ... the name of a deadlock, of a trauma, of an open question, of
something that resists every attempt at its symbolization .... The reassertion of sexual
difference in Lacanian psychoanalysis is thus not a return to biology but a way to stress that
what we all "sexual difference" is first and above all the name for a certain fundamental
deadlock inherent in the symbolic order.
Renata Salecl, Introduction to SEXUATION: Sic 3, at 1, 3 (Renata Salecl ed., 2000).
109. Schroeder, supra note 14, at 863-64, 873, 898-99. 1 discuss the Lacanian understanding of
love infra at notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
110. See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN. BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-
1956, at 12 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., 1993); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas
Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 747-78.
111. FINK, supra note 90, at 123-25.
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existence of feminine negativity in his symbolic world, the feminine must
be repressed. By definition if the feminine is that which is not completely
captured and bound by the symbolic order, she is, by definition, not
capable of being fully described in language. The masculine's positive
existence is maintained only by the expulsion of the feminine's negativity.
In other words, the masculine side of personality insists on
commensuration--everything must be explained, measured, and brought
under control.
The masculine may repress the feminine, but repression is not
destruction. Repression is preservation. In Lacan's famous slogan, what is
repressed in the symbolic returns in the real. 1 2 Because the masculine is
only created by the expulsion of the feminine, the feminine must continue
to exist in order for the masculine to create itself. One need not expel or
repress that which does not function. Consequently, by denying the
feminine, the masculine calls her into being. 1
3
This concept is expressed in Lacan's formula of masculinity--"all
subjects are submitted to the phallic order" (i.e. the symbolic).1 14 The
negation of this formula is that there is at least one subject who is not so
subjected.
Obversely, the feminine's insistence on the inevitability of castration
contradicts the masculine position of wholeness. Lacan calls Woman pas
toute-not all or not whole." 5 This is because the formula of the feminine
is "not all x's are subject to the phallic order."'"16 This might alternately be
translated as the subject is not wholly so subjected. This does not mean
that any specific subject actually escapes the chains of law, but merely that
it may be possible that some subjects are not completely so confined. The
negation of the feminine formula is "there is no subject who is not
subjected to the symbolic order." In other words, the feminine is the
insistence on incommensurability--there is always something that escapes
all of our attempts at explanation, measurement, and control.
Just as the negation of the masculine formula implies the feminine, the
negation of the feminine formula implies the masculine. But note that the
112. LACAN, supra note 110, at 86; Schroeder, supra note 110, at 747-48.
113. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Eumenides: The Foundation of Law in the Repression of the
Feminine (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); SCHROEDER, supra note 29.
114. LACAN,supra note 46, at 78-81.
115.
[Wihen I write [the matheme of the feminine], a never-before-seen function in which the
negation is placed on the quantifier, which should be read "not whole," it means that when any
speaking being whatsoever situates itself under the banner "women," it is on the basis of the
following--that is grounds itself as being not-whole in situating itself in the phallic function.
Id. at 72. Lacan continues: "The fact remains that if she is excluded by the nature of things, it is
precisely in the following respect: being not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to
what the phallic function designates by way ofjouissance." Id. at 73. See also Schroeder, supra note
113.
116. LACAN, supra note 46, at 78-81.
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negation of the two formulae do not operate in the same way. The
masculine formula is a classic scientific hypothesis that can be
falsified-it is an induction. Indeed, its negation is its falsification: the
proposition that all subjects are subject to the symbolic order is disproved
by the observation of one unsubjected subject. One woman, disproves
man. This is why the very concept of the masculine is dependent on and
incompatible with the feminine. The masculine position can be conceived
as the anxiety that it will eventually be proven that any specific rule is not
necessary; that he is free and, therefore, responsible for his actions.
The feminine formula is a classic unfalsifiable proposition-it is a
deduction. It is not bound by the causal laws of science, but is free. The
feminine proposes that one subject might escape, or at least partially
escape, the symbolic order. But this proposition cannot be falsified, only
verified-we could only disprove it if we could observe every subject in
the universe who has ever existed or will exist. No matter how many
subjects we observe who are completely bound by the symbolic order, this
does not disprove the possibility that the next one might escape." 17 The
feminine position is the unquenchable hope that we eventually might
experience freedom.
D. Metaphor and Metonymy
The sexual impasse is of the very nature of signification. Here we find
the fundamental dialectic between commensuration and
incommensuration.
1. Linguistic Theory
Lacan theory of the symbolic is highly influenced by Ferdinand
deSaussure's linguistic theory. A complete understanding of Lacan's
rewriting of Saussure is unnecessary, however, for the point I am making
in this Article. What is relevant is Lacan's concept that all symbolic orders
(including law and language) depend on what he calls "signification,"
which in turn requires the two tropes of metaphor and metonymy. In
Lacan's terminology, commensuration is a form of metaphor and
incommensuration is a form of metonymy. Consequently, Lacanian theory
posits that a legal order can no more choose between the concepts of
117. Schauer also notes this "asymmetry" within the commensurability debate:
The asymmetry is that a belief in the position commonly known as incommensurability does not
commit the believer to the position that all conflicts of values, reasons or options involve
conflicts of incommensurable values or norms, but only to the position that there is at least one
conflict between incommensurable values or norms. In contrast, however, a belief in the
position commonly known as commensurability commits the believer to the position that all
reasons or values are commensurable. Consequently, the existence of one incommensurable pair
renders commensurability false, but the existence of one commensurable pair does not even
come close to rendering incommensurability false.
Schauer, supra note 12, at 1230.
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commensurability and incommensurability than a language can choose
between metaphor and metonymy.
Following Saussure, Lacan expresses signification by the formula Sis,
or "the signifier stands over the signified."118 A seemingly simple example
of this is the idea that a word (a signifier, S) is separate from, but
nevertheless represents, something else (a signified, s). Lacan and
Saussure's proposition, is that not only is there no necessary or natural
relationship between any specific signifier and any specific signified, but
also that signifiers never relate to external reality per se, but always to
other signifiers---each signified is, in fact, a signifier. That signifier, in
turn, stands for another signifier ad infinitum in an unchanging chain of
signification. 1 9 This is the familiar idea that no word has any independent
signification but can only be understood in the context of sentences
composed of other words in a conversation, within a language with a
specific vocabulary and grammar. No legal rule can be understood in
isolation, but only in the context of a specific legal system, with chains of
precedence and application, rules of interpretation, and so forth.
To understand signification, it is helpful to distinguish it from
"meaning," which Lacan locates in the imaginary (as opposed to the
symbolic) order. 120 Meaning is picture thinking or the pure, simple one-
on-one identification of two concepts.12 ' It is the simplistic, unmediated
thought we associate with animals. An example of meaning is a bull
charging at a matador's cape. The bull does not think that the cape stands
for the matador, but rather the cape is just that which makes him angry.
The implications of this is that signification is temporary and
contingent. No signified has any necessary or permanent relationship to
any specific signifier. Rather, both the speaker and the listener must
connect the signified to a signifier within a specific context. It is the
speaking subject herself who contingently assigns a signifier to a signified.
But it is the subjective nature of this assignment that reveals that there is
no permanent, objective relationship between the upper and lower register
of signification.
118. LACAN, supra note 99, at 149. Lacan modifies Saussure's formula slightly, but the
modification is not relevant to my present analysis.
119. See Schroeder, supra note 47, at 26-28. "Lacan compared this chain of signifiers as 'rings of
a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings."' William J. Richardson, Lacan and the
Subject of Psychoanalysis, INTERPRETING LACAN, 6 PSYCHIATRY & THE HUMAN. 54 (Joseph Smith &
William Kerrigan eds., 1983) (quoting LACAN, ECRITS). As Richardson explains, "The meaning of this
chain does not 'consist' in any one of these elements but rather 'insists' in the whole, where the
'whole' may be taken to be the entire interlude as described, whose meaning, or rather whose 'effect'
of meaning, is discerned retroactively..." Id. at 55.
120. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56,
54 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., 1993).
121. LACAN, supra note 110, at 54; SLAVOJ 2I2EK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT,
HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 123 (1994); Schroeder, supra note 107.
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2. The Sexuality of Signification
Nevertheless, in order to speak, one must somehow temporarily relate
signifiers to signifieds and pause the giddy movement of the chain of
signification. The two tropes of signification are the "masculine" trope of
metaphor and the "feminine" trope of metonymy. In metaphor, the
speaking subject takes on the masculine position and, if only temporarily,
denies that the big Other is castrated. The masculine speaker temporarily
crosses the bar that separates the signifier and signified, freezing the
relationship between the tWO.122 It momentarily reduces symbolic
signification to imaginary meaning. That is, metaphor maintains that the
word is equivalent to its meaning. For example, in the context of a specific
sentence, one might treat the word "frog" as though it really were the little
bug-eyed, hopping amphibian one imagines in one's mind's eye. But
doing so represses the fact that in other contexts, even in English, the
signifier "frog" might stand for a raspy throat, a device to hold flowers, an
ornamental button loop, part of a horse's hoof, part of a violin bow, or a
disparaging term for a Frenchman, among other meanings. In other
contexts and languages, "frog" may have different significations or none
at all.
Metaphor is quantitative equivalence and, therefore, commensuration. It
is an insistence on a true relationship between the signifier and the
signified. The signified and the signifier share some essential factor in
common. The signifier and signified can be reduced to and compared in
relationship to a common denominator.
In metonymy, however, the speaker realizes that the symbolic order is
castrated and that the signifier can never capture the truth of the signified.
Metonymy recognizes the sliding of the universe of signifiers above the
bar of signification, and of the universe of potential signifieds below the
bar. 1 23 Rather than trying to capture the signified directly, in metonymy,
the speaker only refers to the signified indirectly--by referring to its
context, to its attributes or to its parts. 24 One familiar form of metonymy
is synecdoche-the use of a part to refer a whole. Lacan's gives the
literary example of referring to a fleet of ships as thirty sails. 125
Metonymy is qualitative difference and, therefore, incommensuration. It
insists that the signified and signifier can never be simply reduced and
equated to each other; each always remains unique.
Both metaphor and metonymy are inadequate descriptions of the
universe. As I have discussed elsewhere, 26 although neither metaphor nor
122. FINK, supra note 90, at 70.
123. LACAN, supra note 99 at 157.
124. Schroeder, supra note 110, at 762-63.
125. LACAN, supra note 90, at 156.
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metonymy can maintain its claim of truth, each fails for a different reason.
When using metaphor, the speaker insists that it is saying something true
about the signified in that there is an essential equivalence between the
signifier and the signified. When Romeo said that "Juliet is the sun,, 127 he
meant that she was truly beautiful, brilliant, and warm. However, by
reducing the signified to this one common denominator metaphor also lies
about the signified. Indeed, if the signified and the signifier were truly
equivalent, the trope would not be a metaphor. No matter what other
similarities there might be, it is untrue that Juliet is a giant ball of burning
gas.
In contrast, metonymy is careful never to lie about the signified. But
metonymy is inadequate because she never says anything affirmative
about the signified. She cannot bear witness even though she can swear to
tell the truth and nothing but the truth, because she is unable to tell the
whole truth.
The most important point to learn from this discussion is that both
metaphor (commensurability) and metonymy (incommensurability) are
essential to language. Indeed, as the common denominator of language,
metaphor/commensuration is communication between subjects. Despite
romantic fears that commensuration causes alienation and
depersonalization, Lacan shows that without commensuration there can be
no human relations.
VI. COMMENSURATION, INCOMMENSURATION, AND PERSONALITY
A. Exchange
To recapitulate, Kant conceives of freedom and the rule of law as
antinomies in that both can be true at the same time. For Hegel, all
concepts are qualitative (incommensurate) and quantitative
(commensurate)-a contradiction that is constitutive of every concept. For
Lacan, metaphor stands for the commensuration of signified and signifier,
while metonymy stands for their incommensuration.
Given these insights, it should be possible to show that the prime
economic concept-market exchange-requires both commensurability
and incommensurability. This will show that the either/or structure of the
commensurability debate is inadequate.
Both utilitarians and their romantic opponents believe that market
exchange is an example of pure commensuration. It supposedly flattens
out the qualitative universe and reduces everything to pure quantity. This
process is sometimes called "commodification" the process by which, at
the appropriate relative price structure, any object is indistinguishable
127. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act Ii, sc. 1.
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from any other. As I have written elsewhere, "both the utilitarian and the
romantic think markets lead to commodification and that commodification
is the suppression of difference. The romantic fears this vision as a
perversion of human freedom while the utilitarian embraces it as the
fulfillment of human freedom"'128 [i.e. the development of the efficient
market that can lead to utility or wealth maximization]. This is a grave
misunderstanding. The doctrine of the identity of identity and difference
reveals that contract exchange is the actualization of quantitative identity
and qualitative difference. 129 It is the paradoxical point of intersection
between commensurability and incommensurability.
I have argued extensively in the past that markets are essentially erotic
and that, from a Hegelian perspective, contract is a primitive form of the
relationship that Lacan called "love.' 130 Love is a mode of intersubjective
relationship in which lover initially sees in his beloved more than she is.
When love is requited, the beloved fulfills her lover's expectations and
becomes more than she once was. The parties reverse roles so that the
beloved-now a lover-sees in her lover-now her beloved--more than
he is.' 31 That is, love is a form of alchemy that creates something out of
nothing. 13
2
Students of Hegel will recognize this theory of love as parallel to the
dialectic of recognition introduced in the Phenomenology of Spirit 33 and
developed in the Philosophy of Right. 134 According to Hegel, the abstract
person identified by liberal philosophy can only become a subject when he
is recognized as such by another subject. 35 In order for this process to
start, one abstract person must first recognize a second abstract person as a
subject by granting her rights--that is, the first person must see in the
second person more than she is. The second person fulfills the first's
expectation by acting as a subject and by turning around and granting the
first the recognition of subjectivity that he craves by granting him
reciprocal rights. For reasons that I explore elsewhere, Hegel argues that
the most "primitive" from of mutual recognition occurs in the private
128. Schroeder, supra note 14, at 884.
129. See HEGEL, supra note 64, at 419.
130. This is the central thesis of my two books SCHROEDER, supra note 113 and SCHROEDER,
supra note 84.
131. ZIZEK, supra note 101, at 103; see also Milan Bo;ovic, The Bonds of Love: Lacan and
Spinoza, 23 NEw FORMATION 69 (1994); Schroeder, supra note 14, at 863.
132. Schroeder, supra note 14, at 863.
133. W.G.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1977) (1807).
134. W.G.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 67-69 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821).
135. Hegel's reasoning is beyond the scope of this Article. I explain Hegel's analysis in
Schroeder, supra note 14, at 860-63.
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regime of property and contract whereby two market participants
temporarily recognize each other in the mutual exchange of value. 13
6
We now can see that market exchange is, from a Lacanian perspective a
form of sexual relationship (love). It is the paradoxical moment when the
two sexuated positions of commensurability and incommensurability
come together and unite-albeit only temporarily and imperfectly.
Both the utilitarian and the romantic forget that the economic notion of
indifference-where one is really indifferent between two correctly priced
"commodities"' 37
-exists only in the impossible, "real" hypothetical
universe known as the perfect market. 38 According to neo-classical price
theory, in the perfect market all goods instaneously move to the highest
valuing user-indeed, they have always already done so. No one has any
reason to engage in additional exchange because no future exchange could
bring any party greater satisfaction. This is not because market
participants have become perfectly happy, but that they have become
perfectly apathetic. If the perfect market could be achieved, then all desire
will have been satisfied and all activity-and subjectivity-would grind to
a halt. The perfect market is pure entropy. Participants in the perfect
market no longer participate, but withdraw. They do not exchange
because, like Bartleby, they "prefer not to."',3 9 They are the living dead.
The perfect market is not merely empirically impossible, it is theoretically
impossible as well. It is what Lacan paradoxically called the "real." Actual
markets, however, are "symbolic."
All actual exchange presupposes that the parties form ratios of
value-comparing the objects to be exchanged to some third value-as the
commensurabilists insist. But both sides of the argument come to
different, and inverse errors, based on this false assumption. The utilitarian
is so concerned with the fact that comparison is made that he places all
emphasis on the denominator. The importance and uniqueness of the
numerator is repressed. That is, he declares the numerator to be subsumed
into the denominator so that everything is reduced to the metric-whether
conceived as money, utils, or whatever. He forgets that the comparative
value of the two ratios, and the reason exchange exists, is not due to the
universality of the denominator, but because of the particularity of the
numerator. In contrast, the romantic correctly insists on the particularity of
the numerator but feels that, she must repress the very existence of the
denominator in order to give the numerator its due.
136. Id. at 863-64, 870-73.
137. Id. at 897-98.
138. The following is an abbreviated version of an argument I develop at length in Jeanne L.
Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARv. L. REV. 483
(1998).
139. HERMAN MELVILLE, Bartleby, the Scrivener, in HERMAN MELVILLE, THE COMPLETE
SHORTER FICTION 18, 25 (John Updike ed., 1997).
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The perfect market is a system that, like utilitarianism, can only
accommodate the denominator of value. Commensuration reduces all
ratios of exchange to a common denominator so that they can be compared
and equated. Therefore, it is a truism that the very fact that exchange
occurs conclusively demonstrates that the exchange parties are not
indifferent between the "commodities" exchanged. Each party to the
exchange would prefer to have what the other has and vice versa. The
parties to exchange concentrate on the numerator; each object remains
unique and non-reducible to the other despite the fact that both objects
exchanged are compared to a common denominator.
In other words, although commensuration is a necessary precondition to
exchange, it is insufficient. If two objects were completely commensurate,
there would be no reason to exchange them. As contradiction is the engine
of change and growth in the universe, then incommensurability is the
engine of market activity in the economy.
The utilitarian would answer that commensurability does give a reason
for exchange-indeed the only rational reason. The reason one exchanges
one's widget for another's whoozit is because one believes that the
whoozit contains more of the common denominator of exchange than the
widget-i.e. it has a bigger numerator. That is, the choice is based on
quantitative difference reflected in the relative size of the numerators: this
is what commensuration means.
But this utilitarian understanding of the exchange process misses the
point: in order for exchange to occur, each party to the exchange must
necessarily base her determination of the relative quantitative value of the
two objects of exchange on her subjective valuation of the qualitative
difference between them. That is, the quantitative relationship between the
two objects is determined by the unique qualitative difference between
them. In economic terms, each party's subjective use value in the object to
be acquired must exceed not only the intersubjective exchange value
assigned to it, but also her subjective use value of the object to be
relinquished. As Elijah Millgram correctly puts it, "commensurability is
the result, rather than the precondition of practical deliberation."' 140
This repression of the source of the value of the numerator relates to
neo-classical economics' famous inability to account for taste141 Neo-
140. Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
supra note 4, at 151.
141. George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker the exceptions that prove this rule. They argue that
economics cannot achieve its goal of being a predictive science until it understands how preferences
are formed. In their famous essay De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum (67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977)),
they turn the famous clich6 "there is no arguing about tastes" on its head. They posit that rather than
tastes being disparate and purely subjective-so that argument would be meaningless--tastes are in
fact discrete and objective-and, therefore, there is no disagreement after all. They posit that all
mankind shares a limited number of very general desiderata such as social status. Specific
commodities are only acquired as means to achieve these general ends. In other words, Carrie on Sex
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classical economic theory posits that the rational person seeks the most
efficient means to achieve his ends. 42 It has, however, no theory as to how
ends are chosen. Rather, ends are treated as purely idiosyncratic, pre-given
and beyond rational thought. That is, economic rationality (the choice of
means) requires irrationality (the choice of ends) as its necessary
correlate. 143 As I have discussed elsewhere, 44 this is in stark contrast to
speculative theory which sees rationality as nothing but the capacity for a
subject to choose an appropriate ends, and relegates the choice of means to
the necessary, but less exalted, category of practical reasoning., 45 In other
words, neo-classical economics is incapable of fully accounting for the
numerator of exchange because it is largely the product of "irrational"
preferences. 146
and the City does not desire Manolo Blahnik shoes per se, but only as a means of achieving her true
desire of being perceived as fashionable and sexy. See Schroeder, Rationality, supra note 14, at 221.
142. "[R]ationality is the ability and inclination to use instrumental reasoning to get on in life."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (1992).Philosopher of economics Mark Blaug
describes the neo-classic notion of rationality as follows:
For the economist,..., rationality means choosing in accordance with a preference ordering that
is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information; where there is
uncertainty about future outcomes, rationality means maximizing expected utility, that is, the
utility of an outcome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence.
MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS OR HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229 (2d. ed.
1992).
143. Posner states: "preferences cannot be divorced from emotion, or emotion from their stimuli,
and so instrumental reasoning cannot be thought pervaded with irrationality merely because a frequent
goal of such reasoning is a preference that we would not have if we were not emotional beings."
Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (1998).
144. Schroeder, supra note 52.
145. Joseph Raz calls these two diverse
conceptions of human agency.., the rationalist and the classical. In broad outline the
rationalist holds that paradigmatic human action is action taken because of all the options open
to the agent, it was, in the agent's view, supported by the strongest reason. The classical
conception holds that the paradigmatic human action is one taken because of all the options the
agent considers rationally eligible, he chooses to perform it.... First, the rationalist conception
regards reasons as requiring action, whereas the classical conception regards reasons as
rendering options eligible. Second, the rationalist conception regards the agent's own desire as a
reason, whereas the classical conception regards the will as an independent factor. Third, the
classical conception presupposes the existence of widespread incommensurabilities of reasons
for action, whereas the rationalist conception, if not committed to complete commensurability, is
committed to the view that incommensurabilities are relatively rare anomalies.
Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 4, at 110, 111.
146. This repression of the numerator's origins also relates to the inability of the wealth-
maximization paradigm to account fully for use value. Posner has suggested that law should seek to
maximize wealth, rather than utility. This is supposed avoids many of the classic evils of
utilitarianism, including the inability to make intersubjective comparisons among economic actors.
Wealth is defined as the total goods in a society measured by money. Wealth maximization only gives
credence to those preferences that an economic actor can actualize by actually paying for. Posner
claims that this does not mean that wealth maximizers only recognize exchange value. Rather, he
claims that his definition of wealth includes consumer surplus-the excess by which each member of
society's subjective use value exceeds society's objective exchange value for the objects he owns. As I
explain in Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 110, at 757-60, in fact Posner's system has no way
to make this calculation prospectively. One can only posit that an individual has some consumer
surplus in her possessions by the fact that she does not exchange them. We can only retroactively
calculate her past consumer surplus after she trades a possession after the exchange value has risen.
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The utilitarian also ignores the fact that even if the denominator of
exchange is objective, at least in the weak sense of "intersubjective" (it is
determined only by the contingent agreement of the parties who set an
exchange ratio or price), nevertheless, for exchange to occur the
numerators of value must be subjective in the sense of unique to each
party. That is, if both parties agreed that the ratio of item 1 to the common
value is greater than the ratio of item 2, no exchange would occur. Rather,
it is necessary for one party to decide that the ratio of item 1 is greater than
the ratio of item 2, and for the other party to decide that the ratio of item 2
is greater than the ratio of item 1. This is, of course, the commonly-cited,
but poorly understood, distinction between subjective "use value" and
objective "exchange value." It is always the unique, subjective use value
(incommensuration) that determines whether an exchange occurs or not.
As Huigens says, it is precisely the inability of price (exchange value)
fully to capture (use) value that gives choice its tragic dimension.1 47
As I have analyzed in greater detail elsewhere, 148 this is why market
exchange falls within Lacan's category of "love." Each party sees in the
other more than she has (that is, each non-possesory party recognizes a use
value in the object owned by the possessory party that is greater than
either the exchange value or the use value to the possessor). And each
party fulfills the expectations of the other by giving more than she had (i.e.
she transfers this greater use value). Consequently, market exchange is a
form of alchemy that in effect makes something out of nothing in that that
the aggregate of use value owned by both parties is greater after the
exchange than it was before the exchange.
149
It is, however, as wrongheaded for the romantic to look only to the
numerator and deny the denominator as it is for the utilitarian to privilege
the denominator over the numerator. On the one hand, if the
commensuration or equalization of two objects can only occur if we first
recognize their difference, paradoxically, the uniqueness of the two that
can only be actualized in comparing them by use of a denominator.
50
147. Huigens, supra note 85, at 546-47.
148. Schroeder, supra note 14, at 863, 870-73.
149. Note, I am not making the assumption frequently made by proponents of market transactions
that this will result in an aggregate increase in the use value, utility or wealth of society as a whole.
The transaction could cause negative externalities that might cause a reduction of the use value, utility
or wealth of third parties so that there is a net loss to society. A vivid example of this problem often
arises in love affairs. An affair might bring great joy to the lovers, but also terrible pain to others such
as jilted old lovers, abandoned spouses, neglected children, disappointed parents, etc. Moreover, as
Huigens correctly notes, the fact that use value can never be completely captured in exchange value
can also result in "tragic choices" in which on part to a forced exchange loses something that can
never be recaptured. See supra text at note 85.
150. As I have stated elsewhere:
It is true that by agreeing to an exchange, the parties recognize the objects exchanged are
equivalent in the sense of having the same exchange value. But the only reason why exchange
occurs is because the parties recognize an essential difference between the objects to which they
are not indifferent. In other words, when I enter into the widget contract I am simultaneously
2003]
39
Schroeder: The Laconomics of Apples and Oranges
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
In other words, in the real world of actual markets and pragmatic
problems, one cannot choose between commensurability or
incommensurability because they are both necessary, albeit in conflict. As
is the case with the two sexes, each concept necessarily presupposes the
existence of the other. Because they are incompatible, the relationship
between the two is logically impossible, yet the two positions
meet-albeit temporarily, contingently, imperfectly, and miraculously-at
the moment of exchange.
The arguments that commensurability is "true" and that market
exchanges actualize qualitative as well as quantitative difference do not,
however, mandate that we accept the arch-commensurabilist position that
we should make choices solely on which of two choices is quantitatively
superior based on a common metric (let alone the common metric of
money). Quantitative equality is merely a restraint on exchange. 151 In the
real world, we are rarely, if ever, truly indifferent between choices. Choice
is always made based on quality.
B. Dignity and Price
In addition to identifying the logical paradoxes of antinomies, Kant also
anticipates the moral implications of the commensurability debate in a few
famous, but elusive, paragraphs in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals.' What I find interesting about Kant's analysis of
incommensurability is that his conclusion is precisely the reverse of that
reached by the romantic proponents of incomensurability in the
contemporary jurisprudential debate. As a Lacanian, I am influenced by,
but not a proponent of, Kantian moral philosophy. I suggest, however, that
Kant's analysis should give pause to incommensurabilists in that it might
recognizing that my money and your widget are essentially equivalent while demonstrating that
my money is fundamentally different from widgets in that I prefer the latter over the former. The
establishment of identity in commodification [quantitative equality, commensuration] and
contract is not, therefore, the suppression of difference, but the actualization of difference
[quality, incommensuration].
Both the utilitarian and the romantic go astray because they forget that the economic concept of
indifference is not an empirical description of any conceivable actual market. Rather, it is a
hypothetical result of the ideal of the perfect market. Classical price theory posits the truism that
exchange will occur between market participants until they are indifferent between the market
basket of objects that each one of them owns, and all available objects potentially on the market
at the given price ratio. As Ronald Coase has correctly stated .... if the hypothetical perfect
market were ever achieved, all actual market exchange would immediately stop. Actual markets
exist because market participants are not indifferent between the objects they have and the
objects offered in the market. By definition, the only reason why exchange occurs is because
each participant believes that she would rather have the latter than the former. Consequently, . ..
commodification can never be perfect and universal--commensuration always necessarily
implies a moment of non-commensurability.
Schroeder, supra note 14, at 897-88.
151. 1 am adopting what Raz calls a "classical" conception of human action. Reasons do not
require action, they merely render certain options eligible. See supra note 145.
152. Supra note 8.
[Vol. 15:347
40
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/4
Schroeder
suggest that the policy implications of this position may not be what they
assume.
Kant insists that
every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means
to be used by this or that will at its direction; instead he must in all
his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational
beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. 53
Kant's moral question is: how can we have a moral law of duty when each
person, as an end, must be self-legislating? Kant's answer is the
categorical imperative-although each person adopts his own maxims, the
test of morality the rational person uses in adopting maxims is the rule of
universality. 154 This leads to a concept of liberal society as a "kingdom of
ends." 1 55 It is a kingdom in that each citizen has a duty to obey its laws,
but each citizen is also a sovereign law-giver who legislates the universal
law he is duty-bound to follow.
56
It is in this connection that Kant distinguishes between that which is
commensurable and that which is incommensurable. "In the kingdom of
ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be
replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is
raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a
dignity."'' 57 What is it that has a dignity? "[M]orality, and humanity insofar
as it is capable of morality."' 58 That is, because it is law that determines
the worth of other things,
the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very
reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth;
and the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the
estimate of it that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore
the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational
nature. 
59
On initial reading Kant would seem to be siding with the romantic
incommensurabilists in that he is asserting that there are some things that
cannot, or at least may not morally, be commensurated. On a more careful
consideration, however, Kant's point is more subtle and radically anti-
romantic.
One corollary to Kant's concept of the kingdom of ends is that things
that are not rational beings are to be treated as means and not as ends.
160
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 41.




160. Id. at 37.
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These things that are means by definition do not have a dignity and,
therefore, do have a price. In other words, in Kant's view all things other
than morality and humanity can, or morally should, be deemed
commensurable.
The romantic might still be tempted to reply that, nevertheless, Kant
recognizes that humanity is incommensurable. However, what Kant means
by this is probably less than what most opponents of the commensurability
proposition would suppose. Indeed, when considered in context, Kant's
analysis looks forward to Lacan's paradox of the sexual impasse.
First, note that Kant does not say that "humanity" is incommensurable,
but only that "humanity insofar as it is capable of morality" is. 161 He
continues "skill and diligence in work have a ... price; wit, lively
imagination and humour have a... price; on the other hand, fidelity in
promises and benevolence from basic principles have an inner worth."
16 2
In the Metaphysics of Morals,163 Kant expands on this distinction. He
distinguishes between the empirical human being as an animal and a
human being "as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical
reason."' 164 It is only this latter aspect of man that has dignity and deserves
to be treated as an ends in and for himself.165 In his former animalistic
capacity, however, humans have a price "that is to say [his usefulness]
gives one man a higher value than another, that is, a price as of a
commodity in exchange... though he still has a lower value than the
,,166universal medium of exchange, money. In other words, human beings
are both commensurable and incommensurable. But, in contrast to the
romantic position, it is our particularity that is commensurable, and only
our participation in universality that is incommensurble.
To understand the paradoxical implications of this analysis one needs,
once again, to have reference to Kant's metaphysics. As introduced above
in the discussion of Kant's antinomy of freedom and causation, 167 Kant
distinguishes between the intellectual, abstract, objective, eternal,
necessary and unchanging realm of the noumena, and the empirical,
concrete, subjective, temporal, contingent, and changing realm of the
phenomena. Only the former is free, while the latter is subject to the
causal rules of nature. Man is a paradoxical negative union between the
noumenal and the phenomenal. Insofar as he is a rational being capable of
moral reasoning, he is a neumonon. Insofar as he is an empirical
161. Id. at 42.
162. Id. at 42.
163. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1798).
164. Id. at 186.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
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individual, he is a phenomenon. It is only the noumenal aspect of human
nature that has a dignity, whereas, his phenomenal nature has a price.
In other words, the romantic insists on incommensurabilty because she
wants to preserve and recognize the unique particularity of each
individual. 168 Kant, like Lacan, is radically unromantic. He insists that it is
precisely the unique, phenomenal, pathological, concrete, and empirical
aspects of identifiable people that have a price and can be commensurated.
That it is only those affirmative qualities that distinguishes one person
from another that enables different persons to be compared and ranked. To
put this even more strongly, for Kant, to differentiate something is to
compare and, therefore, to commensurate it. Paradoxically, our dignity
consists of an undifferentiated abstraction that cannot be reduced to some
other lower common denominator. To put this in Lacanian language, it is
the feminine moment of personality-in her radical negativity who refuses
to be defined or bound by any specific content-who is the true free
subject. To make this more concrete, the reason it is wrong to sell an
individual into slavery is just because she is a human being like any other
human being and participates in the universal dignity of rational beings,
not because of any individual qualities she might have. It is immoral even
to consider, as our ancestors did, that any individual might deserve to be
enslaved because of her personal characteristics.
Kant's paradox of dignity (incommensurability) and price
(commensurability) is a restatement of the basic Kantian moral paradox:
how do we apply the moral law or right understood as being purely
noumenal and nonempirical when all moral decisions necessarily must be
made in concrete, empirical, phenomenal circumstances?
Hence everything empirical, as an addition to the principle of
morality, is not only quite inept for this; it is also highly prejudicial to
the purity of morals, where the proper worth of an absolute good
will--a worth raised above all price--consists just in the principle of
action being free from all influences of contingent grounds, which
only experience can furnish. One cannot give too many or to frequent
warnings against this laxity, or even mean cast of mind, which seeks
its principle among empirical motives and laws; for, human reason in
its weariness gladly rests on this pillow and in a dream of sweet
illusions (which allow it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno) it
substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of quite
diverse ancestry, which looks like whatever one wants to see in it but
not like virtue for him who has once seen virtue in her true form. 69
168. For example, Radin is concerned that the commensuration (or what she refers to as
commodification) of certain privileged tangible objects (which she calls "personal property") might
lead to the commodification and alienation of people. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note
9, at 198-99; Radin Market-Inalienability, supra note 9, at 1857, 1870-74, 1888, 1904, 1921-22;
Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 345-46 (1991).
169. KANT, supra note 8, at 35.
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In other words, how can we give effect to the incommensurable dignity
of noumenal man while at the same time understanding that every
empirical aspect of every individual man is phenomenal and, therefore,
commensurable?
The first section of Hegel's Philosophy of Right can be seen as an
attempt to grapple with this issue. Hegel agrees with Kant that minimal
essence of man must be something like Kant's noumenal rational
being-personality understood as free will. 7° This is the familiar free,
autonomous individual in the state of nature posited by classical liberal
philosophy. Hegel also agrees that the person understood as free will must
remain an end in and of himself and cannot rightfully be alienated
(commensurated).171 As discussed,1 72 unlike Kant, he does not believe in a
realm of noumena distinct from the empirical phenomenal world.
Consequently, if freedom exists, it must be actualized in the world (in
Kant's terms, it must be practical). He believes that freedom can only be
potential in a theoretical abstract "state of nature,"1 73 and can only be
actualized in the empirical world through intersubjective recognition.1 74
He further concludes that the necessary most primitive form of
intersubjective recognition takes the form of abstract right' 75 -property,
contract, and the market regime of the commensuration of objects.
However, he also agrees with Kant that everything empirical about
individual people is an "object" and, therefore, property, the
commodifiable (commensurable). In Hegel's words, "Intellectual...
accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances (such as
sermons, masses, prayers, and blessings at consecrations), inventions, and
the like, become objects.., of contract; in the way they are bought and
sold, etc., they are treated as equivalent to acknowledged things."'
' 76
In other words, the actualization of the incommensurable dignity of
essential human nature can only occur in the commensuration of objects
that include most aspects of concrete personality. Subjectivity is
170. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 67-69 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., 1991).
171. Id.at74-75.
172. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
173. For example, he points out that the abstract will that "wills only the abstract universal, wills
nothing and is therefore not a will at all." HEGEL, supra note 17, at 40. Consequently, this abstract
freedom is "arbitrary." Id. at 48.
174.
If it is not to remain abstract, the free will must first give itself an existence.., and the primary
sensuous constituents of this existence are things .. ., i.e. external objects. This first mode of
freedom is the one which should know as property, the sphere of formal and abstract right;
property as its mediated shape as contract.
Id. at 63.
175. Hegel describes right as "the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from
within itself as a second nature." Id. at 35.
176. Id. at 74.
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constituted by the internal contradiction of what Lacan will identify as the
sexual impasse-incommensurability requires commensurability.
VII. THE PERSISTENCE OF A NON-DEBATE
The speculative tradition seeks to consider whether apparent
irreconcilable contradictions are in fact necessary dialectical relations. It
also seeks to understand why people cling to this oppositional mode of
thinking and arguing. In Kant's words, this theory seeks to enable us "to
comprehend, how those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one
view rather than the other .... [and] explain ... the fiery zeal on the one
side and cold maintenance of their cause on the other."
' 177
Why, then, are the participants in the commensurability debate so
passionate about a non-existent choice? I suggest that one reason is that
this debate unintentionally serves as a proxy both for other deep-seated
political and philosophical divisions between the participants as well as a
suspicion that the other side is acting in bad faith
Utilitarians, on the one hand, are reacting to a lack of intellectual rigor
and an implicit moral cowardice of romantics who fail to face and take the
responsibility for the trade-offs they inevitably make. 78 In a classic
example, although romantics often say that one cannot put a price on
human life, one in fact, does so every time one decides to drive a private
automobile rather than taking public transportation. 79 The utilitarian's
slogan forms the title of Guido Calabresi's classic book Tragic Choices.1 80
On the other hand, the romantics rhetorically ask "is nothing sacred?"
They claim that the language of utilitarianism is incapable of even
grasping the tragic dimension of choice. They recoil from what they see as
an opportunistic and disingenuous attempt by utilitarians to disguise naked
political choices behind a facade of pseudo-scientific decision-making. As
Margaret Jane Radin insists, the very rhetoric of alienability is
alienating.' 8' To the romantic, the utilitarian is like Oscar Wilde's cynic
who "knows the price of everything and the value of nothing."'
' 82
Utilitarians may claim neutrally to be applying cost-benefit analysis to
generate policy suggestions, but it is impossible to develop all--or even
177. KANT, supra note 28, at 264.
178. We see this implicitly in Johnston's argument that we are socially constrained from making
commensuration explicit in some cases. Eric Posner goes further and argues that claims for
incommensuration are strategic (although sometimes unconscious) attempts to hide one's true motives.
179. Indeed, this is basically the argument expressly made by Arianna Huffington's recent
crusade against sport utility vehicles.
180. As discussed supra in notes 85 and 147 and accompanying text, the utilitarian's emphasis on
commensuration fails to grasp why a tragic choice is "tragic."
181. See Radin, supra note 9, at 1877-87.
182. Oscar Wilde, Lady Windemere's Fan, THE PLAYS OF OSCAR WILDE, VOL. 1 (1999).
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most-of the empirical data necessary to do so. 183 Romantics suspect that
utilitarians inevitably engage in ex-post rationalizations of their pre-given
prejudices by use of pseudo-scientific references to fictional costs and
benefits. 1
84
Finally, and most importantly, both sides in this failed debate claim that
their stances with respect to commensurability necessitate the position
they take with respect to specific policy issues. The utilitarian argues, in
effect, that the various alternatives society faces can be directly compared
based on a specific metric and, based on this metric, one choice is clearly
better in the other. A familiar example might be the utilitarian assertion
that a cost-benefit analysis indicates that a proposed anti-pollution law
should not be adopted. In contrast, the romantic maintains that she has no
choice but to favor a specific position--such as an anti-pollution
law--because the value that law would further-in this case a clean
environment-cannot be compared to financial costs. As Wagner says in a
defense of the romantic position, the point of incommensuration is
precisely to take some alternatives off the table. 185 The strategy adopted by
both sides is guaranteed to avoid, rather than join, an effective
conversation on important societal issues.
Consequently, it is my conclusion that both the utilitarian defense of
commensuration and the romantic rejection reflects the fundamental fear
of freedom that typically characterizes policy arguments.1 86 Both sides
want to argue that the choices they advocate are mandated. The economist
does this most expressly when he argues that the only rational means of
making choices is by ranking alternatives on a single scale.187 Once this is
done, one cannot rationally choose otherwise.
The romantic might be tempted to protest that she, unlike the utilitarian,
is a champion of freedom. Indeed, she opposes commensuration precisely
because it presupposes a crabbed vision of human potentiality.
Unfortunately, the romantic's procedure defeats her noble purpose. The
romantic tries to force choice by declaring some alternatives
impermissible-incommensurability is seen to be reason excluding.
183. James Griffin makes this criticism of the utilitarian embrace of commensuration explicit.
"But a doubt about indirect utilitarianism is whether we could ever perform the tremendously large-
scale cost-benefit calculations that it requires or even arrive at probabilities reliable enough for action.
We can do those calculations in fairly extreme or fairly small-scale cases, but often not otherwise."
James Griffin, Incommensurability: What's the Problem?, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra note 4, at
34, 46.
184. For example, Matthew Adler argues that whether or not commensurability is an appropriate
way for individuals to make personal moral decisions, commensurating the preferences of the citizenry
is an, or perhaps the, appropriate mode of decision making for a democratic government. Adler is
completely silent as to how a government would go about gathering the information necessary to make
these decisions, however. Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 1371 (1998).
185. Wagner, supra note 21, at 1295, 1321.
186. See generally Schroeder, supra note 52.
187. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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In other words, although both sides speak in terms of "choice," they
actually seek to avoid free choice. Both propose a form of argument that
would mandate the alternative choice preferable to them for other reasons.
Choice is, however, always an ethical act. To say that a choice is
mandated is to shirk ethical responsibility.
The speculative thinker, in contrast, defines rationality as the capacity
for pure spontaneity--the ability to be free from the causal chains of
nature and to make choices.
Most directly relevant to this Article, the speculative thinker believes
that one should not-indeed cannot-take a simplistic position for or
against commensurability, as it is necessarily and logically true on some
level, and necessarily and logically false on another. As such,
commensurability and incommensurability are not simple negations of
each other. One cannot prove the truth of one by asserting the falsity of the
other, or vice versa. Rather, the very concepts of commensurability and
incommensurability are dialectically related--each can only be understood
in terms of the other.
Consequently, both sides should drop this non-debate. To paraphrase
Kant, they should either part as friends or they should engage in honest
debate by developing their positions on the underlying political and legal
issues that the commensurability debate merely obscures.
The commensurability debate is another example of the sexual
impasse--the two sexuated positions are paradoxically and dialectically
related so that each requires yet contradicts the other. Commensurability
reflects the masculine position while incommensurability reflects the
feminine. But we must remember that both sexes are failed attempts to
achieve subjectivity. Similarly, both commensurability and
incommensurability are failed attempts to account for truth.
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